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Abstract 
To compare party identification cross-nationally in Europe, we need to analyse both 
individual and contextual characteristics that influence individuals during processes of 
learning and socialisation. Although numerous papers on the strength and occurrence of party 
identifications in Western European countries were published, a comprehensive cross-national 
analysis of party identifications in Europe has not been carried out yet. The thesis aims at 
testing the explanatory power of individual characteristics such as interest in politics, 
contextual variables such as polarisation and the intermediate level characteristic party family 
on the individual strength of party identification across 27 European countries. Comparable 
ESS data are used to examine the strength of party identification of nearly 60,000 European 
citizens. 
The ordered logistic multilevel regression analysis reveals that individual or level 1 
characteristics prove to have the strongest positive effect on partisan strength, among those 
interest in politics, trust and cognitive mobilisation. Contextual variables like polarisation, 
fragmentation and maturity of democracy exhibit important yet slightly weaker influence. 
Accordingly, highly polarised societies and party systems in Europe as well as highly 
fragmented party systems foster strong party identifications. Party family, however, plays 
only a minor role in explaining partisan strength. In conclusion, party identification is a 
widespread feature in both Eastern and Western Europe that is triggered by the same factors 
in both parts. Hence, party identification is a concept widely understood and internalised by 
European citizens, thus making it a suitable and convenient tool for the study of political 
attitudes among the general public. 
 
Key words: party identification, partisan strength, contextual, individual, life-time learning 
model, party family, multilevel model, ordinal response, social capital, cognitive mobilisation, 
trust, polarisation, disproportionality, fragmentation, maturity of democracy, society, Eastern 
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1 Introduction 
 
Political parties play a major role in virtually every democratic system. Apart from providing 
personnel for governing countries, they also serve as important channels through which 
individuals – citizens – seek to obtain political influence. However, only very few people actively 
engage in political parties. Nevertheless, political parties have been very important organisations 
in democracies and much research has tried to theorise the nature of ties between citizens and 
political parties which in turn may lead to certain voting behaviour. In my opinion, it is utterly 
fascinating to scrutinise why individual citizens identify themselves with political parties and the 
effects that may result on an aggregate level: “Any examination of party support (…) similarly 
provides the impression, that there are ‘floors’ below which currently unpopular parties never fall 
and ‘ceilings’ above which even the most popular parties never break through” (Bartle and 
Bellucci 2009a: 4). The general research question is two-fold: Firstly, which factors lead people 
in Europe to develop attachments to political parties with various degrees of strength? More 
specifically, which individual and aggregate level characteristics influence the strength of this 
kind of attachment? Secondly, which role plays party family in explaining how strong an 
individual identifies with a political party? 
The analysis of party identifications in this thesis is based on 27 European countries and will 
provide vital insights into how much explanatory power individual and contextual variables 
cross-nationally exhibit on partisan strength. On the one hand, I shall test hypotheses on how 
individual strength of party identification can be explained by socio-demographic characteristics, 
social capital and political attitudes such as class, religious denomination and interest in politics 
respectively. On the other hand, I shall highlight the importance of contextual factors such as 
polarisation of society as influence factors on individual strength of party identification. In other 
words, it shall be answered how the political environment and the political culture in a country 
shape individual party identifications. Specifically, this provides the basis for comparing the 
degree of importance of these two groups of predictors. 
Likewise, the second part of the research question focuses on party families, i.e. transnational 
groupings of parties that pursue the same kind of policies and had similar origins. Also this 
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question shall be answered by looking at 27 European countries, whereas the partisans were 
grouped into eleven different party families. 
Party identification itself has been a very fruitful though debated concept which will be outlined 
later on. Several ideas of how to conceptualise party identification were put forward: Among 
those, party identification as social identity (the most prominent advocates nowadays are Green, 
Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) and party identification as affective attachment (e.g. Lewis-Beck 
et al. 2008) are the most popular opponents. To locate party identification in the tradition of vote 
choice research, I shall shortly present the three main approaches of explaining vote choice. 
The emergence of theories which aim at explaining voting behaviour dates back to Paul 
Lazarsfeld and his colleagues who sought to explain individual voting behaviour by certain group 
memberships (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948). In other words, primary groups were seen 
as the main anchoring points which, at the same time, determine voting behaviour to a large 
degree. For example, belonging to a milieu that is dominated by the working class may produce 
an almost irresolvable link towards the party that represents the working class: the respective 
labour or social democratic party. This mainly happens due to the large extent and virtual 
universal availability of goods and services provided by mass organisations closely interwoven 
with the party. A second important factor is interpersonal communication which reinforces 
current values and attitudes if the milieu features a high degree of ideological closure in 
comparison with other milieus. Although they studied short-term election campaign factors, they 
viewed rather static social characteristics as major explanatory variables for vote choice (Clarke, 
Sanders, Stewart, and Whiteley 2009: 88-89). 
Conversely, Angus Campbell and his colleagues (1954) related their model of voting behaviour 
to three concepts that are not static as Lazarsfeld’s group membership but that may vary between 
different election situations: Party identification as long-term attachment, issue orientation and 
candidate orientation as short-term factors. In their view, party identification is the crucial link 
between social background and vote that is missing in Lazarsfeld’s analyses (Budge 2010). Major 
influence is exhibited by secondary groups (i.e. the parties) which serve as anchoring points 
(Bartle and Bellucci 2009a: 5), although the Michigan scholars do not neglect the influence of 
primary groups. Their approach focuses on individual political orientations and perceptions rather 
than milieu and social status (Schoen and Weins 2005: 189). In other words, the long-term factor 
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and the two short-term factors connect voting behaviour to personal attitudes rather than 
externally predefined personal characteristics. In their view, political parties were able to 
maintain their position because they function as “points of psychological anchoring” (Campbell 
et al. 1954: 107). 
For the sake of completeness, one step further, Anthony Downs’ (1957) economic view on 
democracy neglects the importance of any sociological background for voting behaviour and 
focuses on considerations of costs and benefits of the act of voting itself instead. As rational 
actor, a voter is well aware of her interests which can be ranked according to a sense of personal 
importance. Given that the voter has sufficient information on parties and programs, she would 
favour the alternative that promises most benefits for her. 
In conclusion, the Michigan model of voting behaviour takes a middle position between the first 
and the latter approach. It has been a very fruitful theoretical approach for the explanation of 
voting behaviour in democratic countries within the past decades and despite the criticism 
directed to the concept, which will be addressed below, party identification is valuable and 
certainly not a specific US-American concept (Grofman, Wayman, and Barreto 2009: 60). After 
all, “party identification is the most enduring of political attitudes, responsible for shaping a wide 
variety of values and perceptions” (Miller and Shanks 1996: 117). This is why a study of party 
identification is particularly interesting: It is connected to many other characteristics and serves 
as proxy for how well a citizen is integrated into today’s post-industrial civic society. 
The original formulation of party identification shall serve as point of departure for a deeper 
cross-national analysis of ties between citizens and political parties. As Key (1958: 638) 
formulates, “the appropriate cross-national analysis might shed light on the question of the 
relation between extent and nature of citizen participation and the character of political systems 
in the large”. Several studies have dealt with cross-national comparisons (for example Berglund, 
Holmberg, Schmitt, and Thomassen 2005; Holmberg 1994; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995); these 
studies, however, were limited to a small number of Western European countries. This thesis 
shall therefore provide vital insights into individual and contextual factors that determine the 
strength of party identifications across 27 European countries, including both established and new 
democracies. 
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In particular and as indicated above, I shall analyse the effect of variables with differing degrees 
of invariance according to the lifetime learning model, ranging from unchangeable features such 
as birth cohort to relatively volatile characteristics such as interest in politics. To illustrate, 
interest in politics and media usage are chronologically much closer to the dependent variable – 
strength of party identification – than for instance birth cohort or social class; moreover, it makes 
sequential analysis an indispensable tool for the analysis carried out in this thesis. Among others, 
emphasis is placed on the theory of cognitive mobilisation which shall be tested by applying 
several indicators. The specific nature of the data at hand allows for the inclusion of variables that 
characterise countries rather than individuals. This approach helps to underpin the importance of 
political climate and political culture as well as political socialisation into society in terms of 
partisan attachments. Polarisation, fragmentation and electoral disproportionality are of special 
interest since no systematic study has been carried out with a large scale sample of both 
individuals and countries. 
In conclusion, both individual and contextual factors prove to be important, although particularly 
individual level predictors show strong effects. Despite recent decline tendencies in partisanship, 
the results confirm the widespread existence and importance of party identification. As Lewis-
Back and his colleagues (2008: 126) point out, “a person’s party identification is the most 
important piece of information that we can obtain to help us understand their political attitudes 
and vote choice.” 
This introduction is followed by the theoretical discussion of the concept party identification. 
First, the nature, origin and development of party identification will be dicussed from different 
theoretical and scholarly points of view. Since the concept originates from the American 
presidential campaigns, a comprehensive section is dedicated to identify similarities and 
differences between the United States and Europe on the one hand and then further within 
Europe, i.e. between the Western and Eastern part of Europe. The hypotheses are located at the 
end of the theoretical chapter, starting with individual level hypotheses via the intermediate level 
hypothesis of party families to the contextual-level propositions and followed by the control 
variable discussion. 
The next chapter deals with methodological considerations. Apart from the presentation of the 
three main data sets that are used – European Social Survey, Comparative Political Data Set III, 
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Manifesto Data Set – the countries under analysis are introduced. Afterwards, the independent 
variable is constructed by using two different variables available in the cumulative ESS data file. 
It proved useful grouping the countries into five originally geographical but more culturally 
similar regions: Western, Eastern, Southern, Atlantic Europe and the Nordic countries. The 
following sections deal with technical issues on how the independent level 1 variables can be 
operationalised, for example cognitive mobilisation by using factor analysis and index 
construction. Especially the operationalisation of the level 2 variables – polarisation, 
fragmentation, disproportionality and maturity of democracy – required sophisticated calculations 
which are therefore presented in the method chapter, alongside with graphs that show the 
countries ranked according to their values on these four variables. The last section of the method 
chapter elaborates on the causal model that has been applied as well as on the technical 
background of the ordered logistic multilevel regression technique that produces results which 
are displayed and discussed in the empirical chapters. 
There are two empirical chapters, one about either of the two-fold research question. In fact, the 
first empirical chapter contains the analysis and interpretation of the level 1 and level 2 variables 
according to the hypotheses. Besides, the predictive power of the model is assessed. The second 
empirical chapter focuses on party family as intermediate level variable and its explanatory 
power. The explanatory power of party family as independent variable is rather small; 
nevertheless, the analysis generated interesting findings. 
The last chapter summarises the findings presented in the thesis and places the results into a 
broader context of party identification as concept worth studying. Though this thesis can 
contribute to the research on party identification, many other interesting factors appear 
scientifically appealing. 
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2 Theory 
 
At first, I briefly discuss the nature and origin of party identifications in the electorate. The 
following two sections deal with remarks on stability and development of party identification 
among citizens. Developed in the American context, some confinements are highlighted in 
sections about party identification in Western and Eastern Europe. This chapter is concluded by 
the hypothesis that will be tested in the models to be fitted. 
2.1 The Nature of Party Identification 
Elections in virtually all modern democracies are nowadays dominated by parties competing for 
parliamentary seats and government positions. Campbell et al. (1954: 88) describe political 
parties as “sprawling, loosely knit organisations, (…) [that] provide the mechanisms through 
which the activities of millions of partisan followers are stimulated and integrated during the 
campaigns”. But what characterises a partisan follower according to that reasoning? It is a person 
who has a certain sense of attachment toward the party of her choice (Campbell et al. 1954: 88-
89). “Choosing” a party one identifies with actually indicates active engagement in political 
processes and the ability to trade different parties off against each other concerning their political 
issues and candidates over time. However, “choosing” should not be misinterpreted as mere 
consideration of gains and losses, but as feeling of ideological closeness or distance. According 
to the classical definition, party identification is psychological in nature and not rationally 
chosen. Thus, on the one hand, the Michigan model is far beyond the static view on the electorate 
that Lazarsfeld provided which was described earlier. On the other hand, the choice that voters 
make during elections is not simply based on mere considerations of cost and benefit, for a 
person’s partisanship in terms of Campbell et al.’s concept is path-dependent to a certain degree 
and does therefore not exist without the retrospection of previous voting experience1.  
                                                 
1 Although Campbell and his colleagues were not sufficiently explicit about the retrospective effects of voting 
behaviour, accusations raised against their model were in part too harsh and exaggerated. 
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In their later work, Campbell and his colleagues adjusted their view on party identification as key 
concept in their voting model accordingly as reaction to the criticism by using field theory: “The 
field-theoretical alternative is to measure the individual’s party identification at the current time, 
on the assumption that this is a perfect distillation of all events in the individual’s life history that 
have borne upon the way in which he relates himself to a political party” (Campbell et al. 1960: 
34). That is very much in line with what Rose and McAllister (1990) 30 years later formulate in 
Birth Age 18 Latest parliament 
Election 
day 
Family loyalties 
(pre-adult 
socialisation) 
Socio-economic 
interests 
Political values 
Spatial context 
Current 
performances of 
parties 
VOTE 
Figure 2-1: Lifetime Learning Model of Voting. 
Source: Own figure after Rose and McAllister (1990: 36). 
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their ‘lifetime learning model’: Political views reflect the accumulation of a lifetime learning 
process (Rose and McAllister 1990: 35). Already at an early point in life, namely in the family, 
individuals are taught to identify with one party and to think of another party as unacceptable 
(Rose and McAllister 1990: 35). In other words, the fundament for party identification is laid in 
youth, but the building of a stable (or similarly decay of) party identification continues 
throughout the whole life. Figure 2-1 shows this relation between time and development of party 
identification according to the lifetime learning model. Crucial points in life such as reaching 
legal age may lead to a more intense preoccupation with study-, work- or family-related topics. 
Specifically, the individual becomes aware of her socio-economic interests based on her current 
social status and prestige. This is accompanied by the current milieu where the individual lives; 
she is therefore exposed to influences by her surroundings. The factor that is closest to the 
outcome party identification is the assessment of the current government. Though meant to 
explain vote choice, Rose and McAllister’s model serves well as theoretical construct about the 
emergence of party identifications.  
Having described the common point of departure of different approaches, this is where the 
models propose different indications. The classical view insists on party identification as “long-
term stable predisposition” (Miller and Shanks 1996: 512), an affective attachment to a political 
party that includes previous voting experience as well as approval and/or disapproval of previous 
party candidates and party stands. Nevertheless, “for most people these party attachments do not 
change easily as candidates come and go on the national scene” (Campbell et al. 1954: 97). 
Party identification is neither a simple membership in a given political party nor a voting record 
(Campbell et al. 1960: 121), i.e. it is psychological (or attitudinal) and not behavioural. 
Nevertheless, party identification as concept does not make any sense without empirical 
implications. Behavioural manifestations of compliance with party standards due to a distinct 
party identification may be “[e]arly decision, lack of vacillation in decision, and straight-ticket 
voting” (Campbell et al. 1954: 147). 
Panel studies have shown that this kind of party attachment known as party identification is 
somewhat stable over time (Green and Schickler 2009; Kroh and Selb 2009; Lewis-Beck et al. 
2008: 111-112), thus proving a high degree of reliability. Therefore, it might seem reasonable to 
follow Miller and Shank’s argumentation which sees party identification as “an extension of 
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one’s ego to include feeling a part of a group” (Miller and Shanks 1996: 120) and compares party 
affiliations with religious affiliations. They also emphasise the feeling of “oneness with the 
identified group (that) provide[s] structure, organisation, and coherence to one’s thinking” (Miller 
and Shanks 1996: 121). In other words, “it may be that for many people party identification does 
not have the capacity to stimulate overt activity, but does have the power to command support on 
the psychological level of preferences and attitudes” (Campbell et al. 1954: 108). Conversely, 
advocates of the retrospective approach neglect the conceptualisation as social identity because 
“affective attachments are not the only kind of predisposition that affects the vote” (Budge 2009: 
26). In line with the lifetime learning model, only the onset of party identification might be based 
on social identity, whereas individual evaluations of parties, candidates and elections gain 
influence throughout the course of life. 
Party identification as psychological attachment structures attitudes (see Campbell et al. 1954: 
146), for partisans generally see the party’s candidates and issue standpoints in a more favourable 
light. It acts as means of complexity reduction and colours the two short-term factors (issue and 
candidate orientation) for each party in a more favourable light, without causing a complete 
closure (Falter, Schoen, and Caballero 2000: 238). As Lewis-Beck et al. (2008: 119) formulated, 
“party identification also leads to internal consistency in the person’s field of partisan attitudes”. 
Accordingly, the party’s function of providing partisans with information shortcuts is reinforcing 
this internal consistency: “Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the 
individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, 
the more exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be” (Campbell et al. 
1960: 133). The term of a supporter of a certain football team may provide a vivid metaphor for 
partisanship (Bartle and Bellucci 2009a: 9): Even in times when the football team does not 
succeed, the fan sticks to her team. 
Although these implications might be true in some cases, it has been disputed that partisans 
behave as emotionally attached citizens (Rose and McAllister 1990). Fiorina’s (1981) approach 
might be regarded as integrative approach; there, partisanship is part of an autoregressive model 
with previous experiences as independent variables. Thereby, party identification becomes 
sensitive to current political events and its status as social identity becomes watered down. To 
sum up, it appears to be more logical that partisanship is responsive to political events and not an 
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“unmoved mover”. Even Green and Schickler (2009: 195-196) admit that party identification 
emerges due to evaluation which is very much in line with Fiorina’s arguments. In connection 
with repeated vote choices, these evaluations may transform into a party identification (Converse 
1976). 
Holding a party identification is related neither to approval or disapproval by other citizens nor to 
any “costs”, although group loyalty might lead to group pressure in terms of compliance with 
party stands conformity. Therefore, formal membership, consistent voting record and formal 
recognition are not necessarily required components of a party identification. Rather, party 
identification is a psychological identification with a party that differs in strength across 
individuals and that might be either positive or negative (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 112).  
Typical measures of party identification include a certain degree of closeness to a party, whereas 
perceived distances towards parties are mainly disregarded. The literature mainly focuses on 
‘positive’ identifications with political parties; that is, a person values and approves a party’s 
Figure 2-2. Ideal relationship between strength of party identification and probable 
direction of vote in the US. 
Source: Own figure after Campbell et al. (1960: 137); Lewis-Beck et al. (2008: 122). 
Strong Democrat Weak Democrat Independent
Strong Republican Weak Republican
←Probably will vote Democratic          0.5          Probably will vote Republican→ 
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political program, its standpoints and actions. Conversely, a ‘negative’ identification reflects a 
person’s disesteem and disapproval with one or more political parties. Especially in Eastern 
Europe, this distinction is valuable since fewer people state a party identification. However, most 
people would be able to name parties they feel particularly distant (Rose and McAllister 1990)2. 
If there was only party identification that affected a voting decision, we would expect a 
distribution of voters similar to figure 2-2. This basic model is also known as the “normal vote”, 
where only party identification is assumed to have an impact on the actual voting decision 
(Converse 1966). However, the ideal curve can never perfectly be achieved, since factors other 
than party identification influence the probability of voting for one party or the other. As a result, 
the independents’ curve might be skewed due to swings around the middle position to one side or 
the other, turning the balance. For example, independents were more likely to vote Republican in 
the 1956 US presidential election (Campbell et al. 1960: 138-139; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 122-
123). 
When it comes to more substantial characteristics of partisans, several relationships have been 
proven. Firstly, partisans are more involved and interested in the outcome of an election than 
independents (Campbell et al. 1960: 143-145). Secondly, there is a strong relationship between 
partisan attitude and party identification (Campbell et al. 1960: 128-130), what supports the 
hypothesis of compliance to group norms and standards, i.e. party stands. Thirdly, a strong 
identifier will conform to what she regards as party standards and will support party goals 
(Campbell et al. 1954: 107). 
 
2.2 The Origin of Party Identification 
By analysing retrospective data on parental party identification background, it becomes evident 
that early party identification arises from parental influences (Stäubert 2010). Campbell et al. 
(1954: 98) offer three theoretical explanations for this: firstly, “party attachment (…) may tend to 
be passed from parent to child and to persist into adult life”; secondly, vertical social mobility 
might be very marginal, so that offspring remains in the same social class as their parents (which 
                                                 
2 An analysis would be fruitful but is not possible with the data at hand. 
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is somehow in line with the early arguments of Lazarsfeld); thirdly, the recall mechanism is 
simply biased. These retrospective data were later complemented by panel data that clearly 
supported the hypothesis of the inheritance of party identification (cf. Zuckerman, Dasovic, and 
Fitzgerald 2007). 
In their later works, Campbell et al. (1960: 147) point out that “the high degree of 
correspondence between the partisan preference (…) may be taken as a rough measure of the 
extent to which partisanship is passed from one generation to the next“. In a broader perspective, 
political socialisation occurring in the family is a process by which individuals are expected to 
adapt to societal values and norms by internalizing those (Hermann 2009: 107). Numerous 
articles have been published covering trends of decline in PID (for an overview see Arzheimer 
(2006)) which is of special interest since party identification of a majority of citizens is only 
possible if subsequent generations are socialised in this manner (Mößner 2006: 337). 
Campbell and his colleagues were also able to show that the transmission of party identification 
from parents to their children correlates positively with the degree of politisation in homes: While 
children in active homes tend to develop party attachments, children in inactive homes are more 
likely to develop partisan independency. Lewis-Beck et al. (2008: 140-141) and Kroh and Selb 
(2009: 114-115) have proved the stability of this relationship today. 
Sears (1975: 106) reminds that naive positive attitudes develop at an early stage of childhood, but 
being replaced by more active evaluations. Research showed that party identifications rapidly 
increased from the age of 11, thereafter gradually increasing during the rest of life (Sears 1975: 
119). Admittedly, these findings applied to the United States; European children tended to 
develop a party identification a little earlier than their American counterparts (Sears 1975: 120).  
Three major reasons for weaker party identifications among children compared to adults were 
found by Vaillancourt and Niemi (1974: 144-145): Firstly, there are few major elections in 
childhood that children are actually aware of; secondly, elections are much less important for 
children; thirdly, children might observe a mismatch between parental party identification and 
vote choice. This makes the pre-adult phase the weakest link in the intergenerational party chain 
(Jennings and Niemi 1976; Vaillancourt and Niemi 1974: 146). 
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Lewis-Beck et al. (2008: 134) adverted to the conception of party identification as based in a 
rational choice tradition, although other researchers conceptualised party identification as 
“running tally” (Fiorina 1981) that takes voting experience into account, as the field-theoretical 
approach does. In conclusion, the origin of party identification is much more complex than 
theorised in the first place. Yet family plays a major role, other groups and social settings at later 
points in time such as elections have influence, too. As a consequence, the multiplicity of origins 
might cause differing significance, meaning and consequences of party identification (Miller and 
Shanks 1996: 163). 
Despite these findings, reinforcement might explain the transmission but not why people choose 
to identify in the first place (Shively 1979: 1040). Shively (1979) drafts a functional model of 
party identification which takes five variables into account about the onset of party identification: 
(1) The sense of civic duty in terms of political participation (motivation) 
(2) Cost of information inherent in voting choice (magnitude of information costs) 
(3) Available resources in order to pay these costs (capacity to bear costs) 
(4) Concern for the quality of the decision 
(5) Availability of alternative cost-saving devices 
The probability of developing a party identification is directly proportional to (1) and (2), 
whereas (3) and (5) are inversely proportional linked to party identification. In addition, 
moderately low concern for the outcome (4) is seen as beneficial in terms of party identification 
(Shively 1979: 1040-1042). However, this last proposition might not fit into nowadays pattern, 
since cognitive mobilisation has contributed to increase or at least stability rather than decline of 
party identification (Arzheimer 2006; Berglund et al. 2005). 
Despite the disagreement about the influence of the various socialisation institutions, there is an 
ongoing debate whether party identification is “based on affect rather than cognition” and is “part 
of a person’s self-concept” (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 134) or whether its main source is cognition 
(Thomassen and Rosema 2009: 43). I advocate a mixed approach that views party identification 
as inherited social identity in the first place that is being replaced by political experiences and 
evaluations successively throughout an individual matures. The strength of bridging both 
approaches is the sensitivity to external political and societal influences which moves party 
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identification into a more endogenous position in terms of voting behaviour. Having said this, 
different political and social settings may produce different strengths of party identification as a 
function of citizen’s response to these institutional settings. 
 
2.3 Stability and Development of Party Identification 
Political orientations such as party identifications origin partly from the current milieu, which is 
the family in case of young voters and youth that hasn’t arrived at voting age yet (Campbell et al. 
1960: 146-147). However, Campbell and his scholars theorised the influence of early 
socialisation as superior to influences that occur after the individual has left its home. In their 
words, “identification with political parties, once established, is an attachment which is not easily 
changed” (Campbell et al. 1960: 148-149) and “that persons who identify with one of the parties 
typically have held the same partisan tie for all or almost all of their adult lives” (Campbell et al. 
1960: 135). Neither change of candidates nor alterations in the nature of issues disturb 
partisanship of the electorate as a whole, thus promoting the hypothesis that citizen’s party 
attachments have persisted through time, i.e. a number of elections (Campbell et al. 1960: 121). 
Avoiding being repetitive, the lifetime learning model provides a more intuitive and complex 
concept of party identification that takes aggregate changes in society as well as individual 
changes into account. 
Regardless of their emphasis on the great importance of parental influence, Campbell et al. 
(1960: 149-150) identified two major driving forces for fluctuations in party identification: 
Personal forces which directly relate to the individual itself, and social forces that denote changes 
at a larger scale, namely the social grouping of a society. Regarding the first type of force, change 
of milieu is the main reason for shifting partisan loyalties: 
“A marriage, a new job, or a change in neighbourhood may place a person under strong 
social pressure to conform to political values different from his own. Close personal 
relationships are usually associated with common political identifications (…). Although 
there are many strong-minded people who hold out despite the pressure implicit in this 
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type of situation, others find it more congenial to accept the coloration of those persons or 
groups whose approval they value” (Campbell et al. 1960: 150). 
At the individual level, Lewis-Beck et al. (2008: 130-133) conclude that party attachments 
established in early adolescence period may not always be as stable as Campbell and his 
colleagues assumed which again supports the view of party identification as function of 
experience with political parties and their personnel. They found that most partisan shifts occur 
due to personal rather than social forces. Lewis-Beck et al. (2008: 134-135) emphasise that party 
identification by no means takes the role as “unmoved mover” and that party identification is 
affected by political forces. Hence, the assumption of long-term stability of partisan attachments 
attained in youth does not always hold.  
Research carried out by Miller and Shanks (1996: 153) proved that not only the level, i.e. the 
mere number of persons identifying with a political party, but also the strength (i.e. intensity) of 
party identifications has declined in the US. This leads to the question what forces influence the 
intensity of a party identification. Campbell et al. (1960: 161) presumed that the intensity of party 
identification strengthens over time: “the longer a person thinks of himself as belonging to a 
party, the stronger his sense of loyalty to it will become” (Campbell et al. 1960: 163). This simple 
Figure 2-3. Exemplification of a non-recursive model for the American case. 
Source: Own figure according to Campbell et. al (1960). 
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assumption of a lifelong increase in intensity has been invalidated by Abramson (1976; 1979; 
1992). I will shed light on the relationship between age and intensity of party identification later 
in this chapter. The same applies to recent trends (mainly decline) and their explanations 
(cognitive mobilisation, weakening of social ties, shrinking groups). 
 
2.4 The Location of Party Identification in the Ann-
Arbor Model 
Apart from party identification, two short-term factors, issue and candidate orientation, exert 
influence on the final voting decision (cf. Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 120). None of these three 
concepts might solely explain voting behaviour, but Campbell et al. (1954: 86-87) point out that 
voting behaviour is a function of coaction of party identification, issue and candidate orientation. 
Specifically, corresponding factors raise the probability of voting, while conflicting orientations 
reduce this probability (Campbell et al. 
1954: 87, 157-164). The Michigan model 
considers political orientations as 
intervening variables between social 
structure and voting behaviour (Schoen and 
Weins 2005: 195).  
Based on that, a non-recursive model 
(figure 2-3) can be expressed to model 
electoral choice. The advantage lies in its 
assumption of reciprocal relation between 
each of the factors. In that reasoning, party 
identification with one of the two major US 
American parties that is connected to the 
social milieu, influences both candidate 
image and issue orientation. Moreover, 
these two short term factors may weaken or 
Socio-Demographics 
Party Identification 
Issues 
Candidates 
VOTE 
Figure 2-4. Funnel of causality model. 
Source: Own figure after Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, and 
Weisberg (2008: 23). 
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strengthen party identification over a range of election if candidates and issues do not find 
approval of the identifier or if candidates and issues brought up by the party correspond to the 
individual’s opinions. There is also interdependency between candidate image and issue voting. 
Although a non-recursive model overcomes some of the weaknesses of the assumption of one-
way causations, it makes the model more confusing and impossible to estimate, since there would 
be more effects to be estimated than variables available. Hence, it is advisable and necessary to 
limit some of the backward effects to be zero. 
In order to make this original model more visible, the “funnel of causality” (Campbell et al. 1960: 
24-32; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 22-24) was introduced. It explains metaphorically how a certain 
electoral choice materialises given a set of prior variables that exist in different time dimensions 
(figure 2-4). Socio-demographic characteristics stand behind the concept of party identification 
which again determines issue and candidate orientation to a certain degree. However, the funnel 
metaphor does not capture the full variety of processes involved in electoral choice. Furthermore, 
the possible repercussive effects of the short-term factor on party identification as suggested by 
the lifetime learning model are not included. In order to allow for such effects caused by the 
specific nature of political systems, party competition and elections, I advocate a model indicated 
by figure 2-1 – the life-time learning model. 
 
2.5 Party Identification in the United States 
Campbell et al. (1954) based their analysis on the American political system, where two parties 
de facto exert hegemony in the electoral arena. Not surprisingly, Campbell et al. (1960: 127) 
found that “nearly everyone (…) could be placed on a unitary dimension of party identification”. 
According to the measurement of PID, the operationalisation has been two-fold: firstly, people 
Strong 
Democrat 
Weak 
Democrat 
Independent 
Democrat Independent 
Independent 
Republican 
Weak 
Republican 
Strong 
Republican 
Figure 2-5. Partisans in the USA.  
Source: Own figure after Campbell et al. (1954). 
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where asked whether they think of themselves as Democrats, Republicans or independent3. 
Partisans were then asked how strong they feel attached to their party. A subsequent question 
prompted independents to stating closeness to one of the two parties which were then categorised 
as partisan leaners (independent democrats or independent republicans). Those who insisted on 
being independent, where categorised as “true” independents (Campbell et al. 1960: 122-125; 
Campbell et al. 1954: 90-91). In this way, nearly the whole electorate can be grouped one-
dimensionally along the strength of their party identification (figure 2-5). The reliability of this 
measurement has been proven several times by its stability over time. The validity was analysed 
by cross-checking theoretical expectations about conflicting situation with survey data; e.g. 
strong partisans tend to vote for “their” party, even though they did not agree with or like the 
party’s candidate (Campbell et al. 1954: 93-95). Furthermore, asking identifiers whether they 
ever thought of themselves as partisan of the opposite party reveals that only very few admitted 
that they once had the opposite PID (Campbell et al. 1954: 102). 
Nevertheless, methodological problems were uncovered: Firstly, grouping the leaners that were 
prompted with the second question into the same seven-point scale presumes an equal distance 
between this category of leaners and the categories of weak identifiers. Petrocik (1974) and 
Fiorina (1981: 103-105) referred to that fact as “intransitivity” and Petrocik (1974: 40) concludes 
that this index of party identification is neither linear nor monotonic with regard to all kinds of 
political involvement. Secondly, most of the independent leaners deny temporally extended self-
identity (Miller and Shanks 1996: 126), although two factors in operationalisation of party 
identification are highly important: an extended time horizon and a sense of self-identity (Miller 
and Shanks 1996: 125). Thirdly, Campbell et al. found that naming oneself a “strong” identifier 
might not always correspond to an objective strong party identification, for the category “strong” 
leaves space for individual interpretations of its meaning (Campbell et al. 1954: 96-97). 
Recent trends in the United States are downwards: Though still the majority of Americans are 
able to classify themselves into the 7- or 3-point scale, the pure number of identifiers has 
decreased within the last decades (Bartle and Bellucci 2009a: 13). 
                                                 
3 “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?” The 
follow-up question for identifying leaners is: “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic 
party?” 
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2.6 Party Identification in Europe 
The presented measure of party identification in the US does not fit the complexity of most 
European party systems. In particular, two characteristics make party identification in Europe 
distinct from its American counterpart: Firstly, the existence of minor parties (cf. Campbell and 
Valen 1966: 247) and secondly, the cleavage routes of many European party systems (Schmitt 
and Holmberg 1995: 98-99). As a result of the first difference, party identifications cannot be 
arranged on a scale that captures both direction and strength. Accordingly, those who refuse 
holding any party identification in Europe cannot automatically be categorised as 
“Independents”, for both independents and people that base their belonging on group membership 
fall into this category4. Furthermore, this category must then be placed in the middle of an n-
dimensional continuum, where n corresponds to the number of political parties considered as 
important for categorising a party system. 
As mentioned, it has been an issue of scientific discourse whether party identification in the US 
can be regarded as one-dimensional; however, the perception of party identification as continuum 
with Republican and Democratic partisanship as its uttermost poles prevails (Lewis-Beck et al. 
2008: 130). Contrary to the US, multiparty systems and thus multidimensional partisanship is the 
norm in Europe rather than an exception. 
In an attempt to transport the concept of party identification to the Netherlands, Thomassen 
(1976) draws a rather dark conclusion about the applicability of the concept. He found that party 
identification is less stable than the vote or even equivalent to the vote (Clarke et al. 2009: 98-
101; Holmberg 1994: 100), that party identification and vote preference cannot be distinguished 
and that party identification is not causally prior to the vote (Budge 2009: 31; Holmberg 1994: 
98-99; Thomassen 1976: 77; Thomassen and Rosema 2009)5. As a result, “lasting party 
identification does not mean impregnable party identifications in political systems where people 
vote for parties, not for candidates” (Holmberg 1994: 100). However, in certain national election 
                                                 
4 Lewis-Beck et al. (2008: 173) identified the problem of respondents that are «closet partisans» that actually lean 
towards a party while they believe that a good citizen should hold an independent position. However, severe 
methodological problems are not expected to arise from this group. On the contrary, in European countries, an 
independent position is not explicitly offered. 
5 Thomassen and Rosema (2009) rely on a very different question wording which distinguishes between adherence 
and attraction to political parties; Green and Schickler (2009: 186) note that this might be error-prone. 
Furthermore, their selection of countries seems rather arbitrary than based on theoretical explanations. 
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studies (e.g. Britain), respondents were forced into the identifier category, because no 
independent category was provided, producing a lack of face validity (Bartle and Bellucci 2009a: 
18). In addition, research proved that question order mattered. In their article, Heath and Pierce 
(1992) were able to attribute some of the instability to differing question order. Since the urge for 
consistency is larger when vote is asked before party identification, they recommend “that more 
‘true’ identifiers are uncovered when the question about party identification precedes the question 
about current electoral preference than when it follows it” (Heath and Pierce 1992: 103). Other 
authors such as Green and Schickler (2009) advert to the specific nature of the Dutch party 
system in the 1970s which might derogate the validity of the results obtained by Thomassen. 
As foreshadowed above, research proved that party identification is much more closely related to 
party vote than in the US, thus not allowing for an analysis of the normal vote based on 
partisanship versus the short-term factor driven vote (Berglund et al. 2005: 106; Thomassen and 
Rosema 2009: 44). In fact, my calculations based on the ESS data show that the correlation6 
between party vote and party identification in all countries covered is very high, indicated by 
values of Cramer’s V around .70 which points to the very close relationship between these 
concepts (figure 2-6). The first column in each of the graphs shows the correspondence between 
vote and party identification when non-voters are included; hence, the values are slightly lower 
than in the second column where non-voters were excluded. For example, roughly 65 percent of 
all Swedish partisans voted for the party they identified with. This share increases when those 
who did not vote are being removed from the table: Then, more than 90 percent of the Swedish 
partisans voted for the party they identify with. In line with Thomassen’s (2009: 52) findings, the 
correspondence between vote and party identification in Eastern Europe is not very different from 
the one in Western Europe: There is no clear-cut division between East and West. Nevertheless, 
the Nordic countries score particularly high on correspondence between vote and party 
identification. Around 91 percent of the partisans voted for the party they identify with (table 2-
1). 
Already in the 1960s, scholars were concerned with differences between the United States and 
European countries. For example, Campbell and Valen conclude that the “phenomenon of party 
                                                 
6 Neither party vote nor party identification can be regarded as ratio-scaled variable (ranked according to left-right 
dimension). Therefore, Cramer’s V is the correlation measure of choice, rather than Pearson’s r. 
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Figure 2-6. Cramér's V (top) and percentage correspondence (bottom) between vote 
and party identification. 
Source: Own calculations based on the cumulative ESS data file. 
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identification has similar qualities in the two countries (i.e. the US and Norway, the author)” 
(Campbell and Valen 1966: 252), although certain features are different on either side of the 
Atlantic. A comparison of France and the United States led to the same conclusion (Converse and 
Dupeux 1966). 
Table 2-1. Mean percentage correspondence between vote and party identification clustered 
in geographic regions. 
Source: Own calculations based on the ESS data file. 
 Including non-voters Excluding non-voters 
Western 76.5 88.3 
Eastern 70.1 85.4 
Nordic 74.8 90.9 
Southern 72.9 85.9 
Atlantic 72.5 82.3 
 
When it comes to the object of an identification, there are significant differences between the US 
and Europe. Political parties in most European countries cannot be seen as only loosely bound 
and decentralised organisations. On the contrary, parties are usually highly centralised, resulting 
in a strong position of the party leader, and membership is connected to dues-payment as 
substantial source of party revenues. That is, political parties yield much more power over the 
electoral arena than in the US, and individual candidates hardly have any chance to enter the 
parliament without a political party backing them. As a result, this marks an important difference 
compared to the US where basically candidates are exposed to criticism and conflict, whereas 
parties are mainly “sheltered” (Campbell and Valen 1966; Holmberg 1994: 100). In Europe, due 
to the relative dominance of parties over candidates and policies (Campbell and Valen 1966: 
247), the effect is reversed, what leads to “double volatility”, i.e. change in both party 
identification and vote choice (Holmberg 1994: 100). 
However, the criticism was mainly directed towards the direction of party identification and not 
towards the strength component which has been seen as important predictor of people’s political 
attitudes and behaviour (Holmberg 1994: 101; Thomassen 2005b: 11). 
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Lewis-Beck et al. (2008: 421) try to explain the persistence of the American two-party system 
with the breadth and depth of party attachments in large parts of the electorate. Thus, the political 
sphere is virtually taken by the two major parties, leaving very little space for new parties. As for 
Europe, party systems emerged that contain more than two, usually more than three parties in 
most countries. How would that relate to the existence and strength of party identifications? On 
the one hand, a larger number of parties that control the political sphere might lead to weaker 
attachments, because one-party governments are unlikely to occur, thus increasing the probability 
for discontent about policies and politicians, what might weaken the attachments over time. On 
the other hand, this discontent with one party might easily lead to a shift in party identification. 
However, as research has shown, people usually do not easily cross the lines of parties (Campbell 
et al. 1960: 127; Vaillancourt and Niemi 1974), although the concept of multiple partisanships 
could offer a fruitful approach: Instead of holding an independent position, an identifier might 
emphasise her attachment to the party she identifies second-strongest.  
As briefly mentioned earlier, another important difference is connected to the societal origin of 
party identifications. European party identifications are much more related to social structure than 
in the US (Berglund et al. 2005: 123; Miller 2010: 27). Therefore, European voters do not 
necessarily need a guide such as party identification for making up their mind since group 
membership that is settled in the cleavage structure of the society serves this function, although 
there is a tendency towards more independency between both that already Shively (1979: 1050) 
has predicted as convergence between the US and Europe. A party identification might still take 
an intermediate function but it is viewed as redundant by some researchers (Thomassen 2005b: 
12). In general, three concepts for explaining ties between political parties and voters exist 
(Thomassen 2005c: 258): Cleavages, party identification and value orientations, whereby 
cleavages again pander the development of party identification, albeit they do not determine it. 
To sum up, the underlying cleavage structures in European countries are supposed to exhibit 
more power on voting decision than the intermediate concept of party identification. However, 
party identification is a useful concept itself. 
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2.7 Party Identification in Eastern Europe 
Despite the methodological problems raised, the concept of party identification has been 
transferred successfully not only to several Western and Northern European but also to Eastern 
European countries (Schoen and Weins 2005: 199-200). However, it was especially doubtful 
whether party identification is a concept that is understood in East European countries. Miller and 
Klobucar (2000) have proven the applicability of the concept in the post-communist societies of 
Russia and Ukraine, where about half of the population can name a party that expresses one’s 
views better than any other party (Miller and Klobucar 2000: 669). In addition, Rose and Mishler 
(1998) drew attention to the importance of both negative and positive party identification in post-
communist countries (table 2-2). The former is held by the vast majority of citizens, whereas the 
number of persons positively identifying with one of the political parties is considerably lower 
than in Western Europe (Paskeviciute 2009: 132-133). 
Table 2-2. Classification of partisans in East Europe according to Rose and Mishler (1998). 
  Party identification 
  Yes No 
Party never vote for Yes Closed partisans Negative partisans 
No Open partisans Apathetic electors 
 
Contrary to Western Europe, Eastern European countries cannot revert to a long history of 
independent institutions of civil society since these institutions were under control of the ruling 
communist party. Therefore, the Lipset-Rokkan model is difficult to apply (Rose and Mishler 
1998: 220). Another aspect closely related to this occupation of the public and political sphere as 
a whole by one ruling communist party, is that identifiers are most likely those who had and still 
have close ties to the now transformed communist party. In opposition to Western Europe, party 
identification might not always be regarded as civic virtue (Rose and Mishler 1998: 221). 
Nevertheless, Evans (2006) points out that pre-communist social identities and interests still 
persisted through the time of communism and that “[t]here is little to suggest that communism 
had removed social divisions in political orientations” (Evans 2006: 262). Despite the 
differences, Eastern Europe differs from Western Europe only in few regards when it comes to 
25 
 
party identification because party identification relies on attitudes, institutions and longevity of 
democratic traditions in both Western and Eastern Europe (Enyedi and Todosijević 2009: 142). 
Much research has been carried out to explore the extent of construct validity, because only a 
measure that is stable over time and space can be used. Eventually, the results were positive, thus 
indicating that party identification cannot be regarded as specifically American concept, although 
country characteristics must be taken into account (Schoen and Weins 2005: 208-210). 
Having laid out the theoretical foundation of the concept under study, the following section will 
deal with the propositions to be tested quantitatively. 
 
2.8 Hypotheses 
First of all, the analysis will deal with the comparison of the strength (or: intensity) of party 
identifications across the countries covered by ESS. Since the units of analysis represent different 
universes, i.e. countries, a multilevel model is indispensable. Multilevel models typically contain 
explanatory variables on both level 1 (individuals) and level 2 (countries). Therefore, hypotheses 
can be formulated on both levels. This approach is very fruitful since already Campbell et al. 
(1960: 157-159) concluded that geographic regions show differences in strength of party 
identifications. 
Many factors have been named as important for the explanation of party identifications: Nature 
of competition, importance of unions and churches as linking organisations, systematic 
ideological differences among party families, and the type of electoral rules (Norris 2004: 130). 
By studying patterns of party identification of teachers in seven European countries (Belgium, 
United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Germany), Rokkan et al. (1970: 294-
295) provide a fruitful framework for studying cross-national variation in individual party 
identification and propose six conceptual contexts (table 2-3). I augmented the table by party 
family as meso-level variable, since it can be argued that there are significant differences in 
political party families with regard to issue coherence and clarity of programmatic solutions 
offered. 
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(1) The political context, i.e. party system, patterns of opposition; 
(age of democracy, polarisation, fragmentation) 
(2) The legal context, i.e. suffrage, system of representation; 
(disproportionality) 
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(3) The socio-economic context, i.e. kinship, education, status, 
occupation; (education, social class, area of residence) 
(4) The communication context, i.e. information about parties and 
politics; (interest in politics, newspaper, cognitive mobilisation) 
(5) The cognitive context, i.e. images and reflections on one self’s 
own situation; (economic performance) 
(6) The personality context, i.e. individual development (age, gender)  
 
2.8.1 Level 1 Hypotheses 
Both Campbell et al. (1960) and Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) propose that the strength of party 
identification is a function of age. In other words, older citizens are expected to hold stronger 
party identifications than younger citizens that are “more likely to be moved by the prevailing 
political tides because they have not as yet developed stable party attachments” (Campbell et al. 
1960: 156). This is because they have not developed psychological ties yet and are not fully 
aware of their own political and personal interests. 
Group theory tells that identification with a group becomes stronger the longer the individual is 
affiliated with the group (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 148). Thus, biological age is only an 
Table 2-3. Framework for the analysis of individual and contextual factors of party 
identification. 
Source: Rokkan, Campbell, Torsvik, and Valen (1970: 294-295). 
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approximation since not all individuals attained an identification in preadult ages, one must 
therefore “adjust the clock” when the democratic process interrupted (cf. Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 
149). In addition, age also serves as proxy for voting/party experience (Converse 1976: 12-13, 
46). 
Regardless of these general statements, the relationship of age and party identification is much 
more complex. For example, older people after system change are expected to have weaker PID 
than youngsters since they were not able to develop party attachments due to the lack of party 
competition (particularly in Eastern Europe, Enyedi and Todosijević 2009; Schoen and Weins 
2005: 214). Furthermore, changes in social conditions and political context are more likely to 
produce changes in party identification among the young – or newly identified – than among the 
old (Miller and Shanks 1996: 184). 
H1: Young citizens show weaker party identifications than older citizens. 
 
Integration into civic society or ‘social capital’ has an important effect on many political 
attitudes. In the framework of this thesis, social capital shall be looked at as membership in 
different non-political secondary groups. Those groups are basically religious denomination as 
well as trade union membership, because membership in these groups pushes its members 
towards a certain partisan attachment, thus promoting “prematurely strong party identification” 
(Campbell et al. 1960: 329-330). As for today, one expects a declining significance of social 
group memberships and in a European context, the division Protestant vs. Catholic might exert 
larger explanatory power than in the USA (Schmitt and Holmberg 1995). The social-cultural 
rootedness of the party system plays an important role, i.e. how closely related partisanship is to 
religion, race and ethnicity (Grofman et al. 2009: 64-65). Therefore, religious denomination and 
church attendance on the one hand and trade union membership on the other hand are also seen as 
indicators for social embeddedness or social capital. Moreover, the membership in other, non-
political organisations is also meant when analysing the impact of social capital. It is not further 
specified which organisation is meant; however, it can for example be sport organisations, charity 
or voluntary work organisations that themselves serve as proxy for civic integration. 
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H2: Citizens that are active members of non-political secondary groups show stronger party 
identifications than their less integrated counterparts. 
 
The theory of cognitive mobilisation assumes a decline in partisanship due to two specific 
developments in advanced industrial societies: Firstly, educational expansion and secondly, the 
spread of mass media (Dalton 1984: 265). Because citizens acquire skills for processing the 
growing amount of information provided by the mass media, the need for information shortcuts 
in terms of the functional theory of party identification decreases (Dalton 1984: 267). Therefore, 
it becomes easier to involve oneself in politics. 
Hence, Dalton (1984) sees cognitive mobilisation as multidimensional concept and distinguishes 
between the skills component and the involvement component which is represented by education 
and interest in politics respectively. However, I argue that interest in politics may not be specific 
enough to capture the whole concept “cognitive mobilisation”, for interest does not necessarily 
imply processing and judging the information available. For instance, reading about the most 
recent political debate does not need to be linked to any assessment of the political issue under 
discussion. In conclusion, a variable that characterises whether or not citizens form opinions 
about political issues based on the information obtained must be included. Moreover, it shall be 
registered whether citizens in general think that politics is a complex and complicated matter. In 
other words, this variable shall capture how often if ever people do meet difficulties in dealing 
with political information. In conclusion, a factor analysis shall help to identify different 
dimensions of the concept ‘cognitive mobilisation’. There are 5 components I shall analyse 
before the regression analysis: 
1. The skills component (educational achievement) 
2. The interest component (interest in politics) 
3. The decisional or assessment component (forming an opinion) 
4. The complexity component (politics as complicated or simple domain) 
5. The usage of mass media. 
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The factors analysis on page 50 will reveal that only 4 of the 5 components have to be retained: 
(a) education, (b) interest in politics, (c) involvement (combining no. 3 and 4), and (d) media 
usage. 
In opposition to the theory of cognitive mobilisation (Dalton 1984; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000), 
political interest – or more generally the ability to orientate oneself in the political sphere – may 
still have a positive effect on party identification; even Dalton (1984: 267) admits that partisans 
are usually more involved than non-partisans. In addition, Converse (1976: 50) found a moderate 
relationship between interest in politics and party identification. Cross-tabulating party 
identification and interest in politics leads to table 2-4 (Holmberg 1994: 114). In other words, the 
expectation would be that habituals become rather partisans than independents despite a wider 
toolkit of information processing devices, because party identification is a product of experiences 
and evaluations of parties and their candidates.  
Table 2-4. Cross-table between party identification and interest in politics. 
Source: Figure after Holmberg (1994: 114). 
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High Partisans Independent
s 
Low Habituals Apathetics 
 
This “inversion” of the original cognitive mobilisation hypothesis is then assumed to be the 
dominant one; an early formulation can be found in Campbell’s work on the American voter: “a 
much larger number of people acquire a certain familiarity with political goings on, and it seems 
likely that this fact is associated with an increasing identification of oneself with the party 
symbols” (Campbell et al. 1960: 164). Berglund et al. (2005: 111-116) were able to disprove the 
theorised negative relationship between higher educational achievement and dealignment for 
their six West European countries under analysis. They excluded interest in politics because they 
regarded it as consequence rather than factor of cognitive mobilisation. However, interest in 
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politics is indeed positively correlated with strength of party identification (Campbell et al. 1960: 
144-145). 
In general and in opposition to Dalton (1984), the dealignment is neither triggered nor accelerated 
by cognitive mobilisation, although the expansion of education and the mass media have led to a 
larger number of people who do no longer rely on information shortcuts provided by a party 
identification. These individuals actually tend to hold party identifications rather than moving 
independently trough the political sphere. In a review of research on cognitive mobilisation, 
Albright (2009: 258) concludes:  
“CM clearly increases the probability that a respondent expresses an attachment to a 
specific party, and this positive relationship does not change across cohorts. In fact, there 
is some evidence that the positive effect of CM on party attachments is growing even 
stronger over time. In sum, neither the micro- nor the macro-level components of the 
theory are corroborated by the data.” 
Due to the obvious deficiencies of this particular part of the theory of cognitive mobilisation in 
some European countries, the theory shall be tested inverted for all countries under study: 
H3: Cognitive mobilisation is expected to increase the probability of having a party identification 
rather than decrease it. 
 
Taking into account that Eastern and Western European countries differ in many respects, at least 
one further variable should be included. As Miller and Klobucar (2000: 671) revealed, one 
distinct characteristic of partisans in Russia and Ukraine as representative cases for post-Soviet 
societies is their sense of efficacy and institutional trust compared to non-partisans. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to include trust in institutions7. 
Despite this evidence, the relationship between trust and party identification is far more 
ambiguous than it seems. Some scholars claim that “the positive effect of party identification on 
political trust is well established (…) [and] argue that party identification is a predictor of support 
                                                 
7 Though trust in political parties is available, a very high number of missings renders the item almost useless. In 
addition, it can be expected that partisanship and trust in political parties are very highly correlated. 
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for the political system and its actors” (Söderlund and Kestilä-Kekkonen 2009: 159). In other 
words, a party identification serves as incentive for developing a greater level of trust. Miller and 
Listhaug (1990) find striking differences between partisans and non-partisans in terms of their 
level of trust. Their main expectation is that an attachment to a political party facilitates trust 
(Miller and Listhaug 1990: 371-372). However, a certain amount of trust is clearly a pre-
condition for a party identification since it seems exceptionally unlikely that one develops an 
attachment to an institution or organisation that she totally distrusts. Having said this, there is 
obviously a chicken-or-egg problem: Which came first, trust or party identification? I argue that 
some kind of trust is necessary for the evolution of a party identification which is in line with 
what Rose and Mishler (1998) found important for the new democracies in Eastern Europe. To 
meet the concerns about trust, the relationship between trust and party identification shall be 
looked at with greater caution. 
Trust can be related to both institutions and individuals, I shall rather focus on institutional trust 
since the link between institutional trust and party identification is the most direct one whereas 
trust in fellow citizens is a bit more remote. However, also trust in other people represents 
integration into civic society and might be regarded as pre-condition for a variety of activities and 
if nothing else trust in institutions which consist of individuals. Therefore, interpersonal trust 
shall be included as well. 
H4a: Trust in institutions is positively related to party identification. 
H4b: Interpersonal trust is positively related to party identification. 
 
2.8.2 Intermediate Level Hypothesis 
Schmitt and Holmberg (1995: 114) reveal that the strength of party identification varies across 
political parties. Although their analysis was limited to Western European countries, they 
revealed that Social Democratic and Conservative partisans showed the strongest party 
identifications. They even concluded that party family was the strongest predictor of party 
identification, amounting for more than 50 percent of the variance, whereas the age of a political 
party turned out to be insignificant. 
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The Greens and the new left have tried to foster new cleavages (Lipset 2001: 7) that emerged 
recently compared to the classical conflict lines in Western European countries. It can be 
assumed that new groups have interests that are more narrowly defined and therefore lead to 
stronger party attachments once a party has been formed to represent these new politics. In 
addition, parties indelibly associated with critical political events (such as the environmental 
movement) are likely to generate strong loyalties (Grofman et al. 2009: 65). The same 
mechanism might be applied to people residing in territories with a strong independence 
movement. One might expect stronger attachments to regional parties as a consequence of a 
cohesive group effect since regional parties promote the conflict between central authorities and 
regional independence. Moreover, extreme parties, especially extreme left parties, are more 
favourable for strong partisanship (Norris 2004: 137-140; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995: 133) 
because they are supposed to tie strong-minded voters up to themselves instead of volatile 
pragmatists. Very much in line with this reasoning is Norris’ (2004: 138-139) argument that 
parties in the middle of the left-right continuum cannot be distinguished sharply which causes 
supporters to switch between the different middle alternatives. 
High member identification of a certain group leads to what Campbell et al. (1960: 309-310) call 
a “cohesive group”. Hence, the transmission of group, i.e. partisan standards, is more likely to be 
successful if a group consists of comparably fewer people (Campbell et al. 1960: 313-314). Apart 
from well-known relations between socio-demographic characteristics that comprise a group, the 
pure size or even perceived size of a group might have a considerable influence on the 
cohesiveness of a group. I argue that smaller groups such as smaller parties and parties that arose 
after a consolidated party systems had developed, tend to show a stronger partisan attachments 
than parties that have existed over a long period and hence are incorporated in the ”political 
establishment” (cf. Campbell et al. 1960: 553). Therefore, partisans of catch all people’s parties 
should show slightly weaker party identifications. This shall not imply that classical social 
cleavages have lost all of their importance; rather, the number of people placed at the polar points 
of cleavages has decreased. 
Since the matter of party families appears to be complex and perhaps contradictory, two 
competing hypotheses were set up: 
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H5a: Partisans of the issue-based parties (e.g. peace and ecologic issues or anti-immigration) 
provide a more favourable basis for strong attachments compared to old cleavage-based parties. 
H5b: Old cleavages still trigger strong attachments. 
 
2.8.3 Level 2 Hypotheses 
Political parties in newly democratised countries such as the post-Soviet countries in Eastern 
Europe emerged in the late 1980s in the surroundings of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Although political parties in most countries had existed before 1989, those can by no means be 
compared to political parties in established democratic systems, since they merely served the 
purpose of simulating political plurality without actually being a factual political alternative. The 
political systems in the socialist countries in Eastern and Central Europe were dictatorships where 
one party and/or one leader ruled the country in autarchy. In fact, Kroh and Selb (2009: 112) 
found a 10 percentage point gap between West and East Germans and Norris (2004: 133) 
confirmed the relation between democratic consolidation and share of population holding a party 
identification. Countries like Spain, Greece and Portugal underwent their transition periods in the 
1970s and are therefore expected to have both a slightly higher aggregated strength of party 
identification and a slightly larger share of identifiers among the inhabitants than East European 
countries. Nevertheless, there should be a gap compared to the “old” democracies in Western and 
Northern Europe.  
Firstly, since political parties were not able and not allowed to fulfil the functions they serve in 
democratic nations, attachments to these parties that might have existed do not fit the concept of 
party identification and can hardly be assumed as stable due to the lack of self-determination in 
terms of partisan choice. Similar to West Germany after the Nazi dictatorship, one might expect 
weaker partisan ties in Eastern and Southern Europe due to the lack of experience with political 
parties and their organisation. Party identification simply needs time to develop (Converse 1976: 
13; Enyedi and Todosijević 2009: 144), since it is a function of evaluations and experiences with 
political parties and elections in the context of free party competition (cf. Converse 1976). In 
addition, political parties in Eastern European countries have changed labels more frequently than 
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in Western Europe which makes attachments more difficult to develop. Moreover, Eastern 
European political systems are still and more than medium long democratic systems characterised 
by weak civic society, alienation from the political system, fluid party images, personalistic 
parties, underdeveloped mass-branch party organisations what again makes parties less popular 
(Enyedi and Todosijević 2009: 145; Norris 2004: 134). As immediate consequence, if citizens of 
those countries mentioned above state a PID, the strength of the attachment is comparably lower 
compared to established democracies. 
Secondly, parties did in general not emerge from social classes or religions in most Eastern 
European countries. While Western European societies are characterised by a set of up to 4 
political cleavages (center – periphery, church – state, land – industry, owner – worker; cf. 
Rokkan and Lipset 1967), these traditional cleavage structures are far less important in Eastern 
Europe than in the countries analysed by Rokkan and his colleagues, though still valuable. This is 
underpinned by Lindström (2001: 216) who argues that the agrarian cleavage has become more 
salient because of the redistribution of land after 1989. A similar mechanism is visible in 
countries with medium-long experience with democracy such as Portugal (Thomassen and 
Rosema 2009: 50). 
H6: Maturity of democratic system has a positive effect on the strength of party identification. In 
other words: The strength of PID is a function of the maturity of a (democratic) political system. 
 
The second hypothesis deals with party system fragmentation. This is a proxy for how the 
political process is designed. One expects that fragmented party system will show a larger extent 
of political debate and harsh conflict which again might lead to a lower level of support for 
political parties as the central actors in the political arena in general. However, the effective 
number of parties in the electorate (see chapter 3) cannot provide any information on how 
decisions in parliament are taken, but for the purpose of this analysis, the general trend that more 
collective actors in the arena lead to cacophony in the political process should be considered. 
Campbell et al. (1960: 552) point out that one of most important aspects of a political system is 
“the number of parties having a realistic chance to control government”. In the United States, 
“large representations of both parties at virtually all social and occupational levels” exist 
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(Campbell et al. 1960: 150) make it easier to find oneself among co-partisans in almost any new 
situation into which one moves. This is not the case in Europe and dissenter position is more 
likely to occur in European countries, since more than two, often smaller parties compete for 
voters and partisans, which raises the probability of entering into a social or geographic milieu, 
where one’s political view is seen as “exotic” (cf. Campbell et al. 1960: 150). 
Related to that argument, the development of party identification might be easier in systems with 
few parties because they simplify voters’ cognitive task of choosing an affiliation (Grofman et al. 
2009: 64; Rose and Mishler 1998: 221). Furthermore, if the same set of parties competes over 
long time, it should be easier for citizens to develop attachments that can be based on implicit or 
explicit comparisons between the parties (Grofman et al. 2009: 64). Consistent with this finding, 
Rose and Mishler (1998: 221) note that Poland has the lowest number of identifiers due to the 
very high fragmentation of the party system. 
Moreover, there is a second reason for why the number of parties plays a role in terms of the 
party attachments. Since the 1980s, new political parties have emerged which have successively 
been able to recruit voters from the established parties. On the one hand, identifiers with one of 
these new parties could not have been socialised in the same manner as youngsters who grew up 
in a family that is attached to one of the established parties. Therefore, one might expect fewer 
partisans among the voters of these parties. On the other hand, identifiers of new parties had less 
time to accustom themselves to the new parties and show therefore weaker party attachments. 
One can therefore assume weaker aggregated party identifications. 
The previously described mechanism could, however, be reversed: Declining support for 
established parties due to discontent with their political alignment, i.e. disregard of new politics 
issues, might lead to more and stronger party identification for the new parties. Since the 
declining support for established parties might outweigh the gain due to new political parties, the 
strength of party identification is expected to be lower in highly fragmented party systems. 
On the one hand, if few parties bear responsibility for political outcomes the behaviour of each 
party is more clearly visible what makes evaluations of parties and programs easier in terms of 
the running tally model. At the same time, space for deprivation might be larger if parties do not 
stick to their promises (Enyedi and Todosijević 2009: 144). On the other hand, a large tableau of 
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political parties offers more alternatives to choose from and finding a party that overlaps with 
one’s own attitudes might be more likely than in systems where the party space is occupied by 
few catch-all parties. Enyedi and Todosijević (2009: 159) were able to confirm the diminishing 
effect of a large number of parties on party identification. 
Schmitt and Holmberg (1995: 110-111) found that the number of parties represented in the 
parliament, i.e. on legislative level, has indeed a negative effect on the share of identifiers8. 
Nevertheless, five of their 14 countries under analysis did not fit into this pattern. Despite the 
great value of their findings, two methodological adjustments should be taken in this analysis: 
Firstly, the strength of party identification cannot be treated as ratio-scaled variable, thus 
forbidding OLS regression. Secondly, the effective number of parties is a more sensitive indicator 
for political fragmentation because it takes into account how many votes a party was able to 
collect. The formula and the characteristics of the measure are laid out in chapter 3. 
H7: Fragmented party systems curb the development of (strong) party attachments. 
 
As mentioned earlier, there might be a difference in party identifications on the basis of different 
electoral arrangements in terms of parliamentary elections. In the United Kingdom, where 
majority voting has taken place for decades, people might tend to hold weaker party 
identifications, for they elect persons rather than parties (cf. Grofman et al. 2009: 64). In other 
countries, such as Germany or Austria, people vote for party lists9, thus providing the substantial 
basis for a manifestation as a party identification. Albeit differences between the election codes in 
the US and Europe, some of the arguments of Campbell et al. (1960: 269-270) can be transferred 
to the European context: “We would suppose that election laws relevant to partisanship would 
have their greatest significance for the development of loyalties represented in our measure of 
party identification. (…) Voters governed by rules most likely to promote partisanship are most 
likely to be strong party identifiers and least likely to classify themselves as Independents. 
Conversely, the voters in states that provide minimal encouragement of partisanship are 
significantly more often self-classified Independents and less often strongly identified with a 
                                                 
8 The hypothesis was confirmed for Belgium, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and 
Luxemburg. 
9 The share of seats depends on the number of votes for party lists, although a majority voting component exists. 
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party”. Since primaries and caucuses are not part of the European nomination processes, the 
relation shall be seen between electoral arrangements such as highly disproportional election 
codes such as majority voting and election codes such as proportional electoral systems. 
A second reason for curbed existence of party identification in highly disproportional party 
systems is the degree of deprivation that might be connected to imbalanced systems. 
Disproportional systems favour larger parties at the expense of smaller parties that might hardly 
cross the threshold necessary for winning seats in parliament. If this is repeatedly the case, voters 
might turn their back either on this party or on the whole party system. 
However, the relation between disproportionality and partisanship remains ambiguous (figure 2-
7). It can be objected that institutions that foster clear government responsibility promotes party 
identification (Enyedi and Todosijević 2009: 142). 
Schmitt (2009) proposes that consensus-oriented societies that go hand-in-hand with proportional 
representation show weaker and fewer party attachments than majoritarian systems. Conversely, 
Norris (2004: 130) argues that majoritarian systems provide strong incentives for parties to 
Figure 2-7. A selected institutional form involving the vote. 
Source: Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960: 274). 
Election code 
Party 
identification 
Voting 
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develop bridging appeals to achieve more support in order to negotiate electoral thresholds, 
whereas proportional rules stimulate the adoption of bonding appeals on core issues due to lower 
representational thresholds. She finds that disproportional rules in that respect promote fewer 
partisans than less disproportional rules. However, partisans in disproportional systems tended to 
be more strongly attached than their counterparts (Norris 2004: 136-137). 
H8: Disproportional election codes inhibit party identifications. 
 
Grofman et al. (2009: 64) assume that the degree of ideological difference between parties in a 
society may influence party identification. In their view, ideologically distinct parties enhance 
party identification. However, they do not provide empirical underpinning for their assumption. 
Schmitt and Holmberg (1995) show that the strength of party identification is related to 
weakening party polarisation, declining ideological conflicts, diminished issue differences and 
increase in number of parties. Enyedi and Todosijević (2009: 144) propose that “ideological 
polarisation of the party system should have the same effect [i.e. promoting partisanship], since 
parties that offer distinct ideological alternatives are more likely to foster emotional attachments”. 
However, another interpretation that is more related to the attitudinal model of party 
identification is the fact that parties in a very polarised society differ strongly according to their 
policy goals that should be implemented once elected. Therefore, it is much more at stake if the 
rival party comes into power which might foster more rationally-based party identifications. 
At a very early point in time, Campbell and Valen (1966) analysed differences in party 
identification between the United States and Norway. They claimed that parties in the United 
states are catch-all parties, whereas political parties in Norway (and possibly in whole Europe) 
are linked to distinct societal groups (Campbell and Valen 1966: 247). Following that reasoning, 
weakening ties to societal groups as well as shrinking social groups should decrease polarisation 
that is based on different group interests in terms of Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage theory. If so, 
political parties are forced to broaden their basis of possible supporters, thus watering down their 
sharply cleavage-based programme in order to attract voters that are no longer or have never been 
member of any of the cleavage poles. In that process of depolarisation, party identifications are 
likely to diminish since the specific content and guidance one party offers, is also decreasing. 
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As Schmitt (2009: 76-77) points out, party identification may be stronger in countries where 
conflict flourishes. This happens due to clarity in terms of political alternatives; in other words, 
there is much more at stake when the party one opposes comes into power, since the 
programmatic distance between the preferred and opposed party is very large. He has repeatedly 
found moderate positive relationships between polarisation and the number of citizens holding a 
party identification (Schmitt 2009; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995). He primarily links inter-party 
conflict to the structure of political competition and proposes that political conflict is suppressed 
by consensus style, whereas conflict may unfold in adversary style systems with majority vote 
(also Norris 2004: 69). 
It has been proven earlier that partisanship increases in periods of higher degree of polarisation 
(for example, Germany in the 1970s: Norpoth 1984). In their study of six West European 
countries, Berglund et al. (2005: 117) found that perceived large distances between parties is 
positively correlated with stronger attachments. This is consistent with findings of Enyedi and 
Todosijević (2009: 151-154) who identified that ideologically radical, leftist, polarised societies 
typically show citizens with stronger attachments10. 
Also Campbell and his colleagues offered an explanation for changing party attachments 
although they emphasised changes at the aggregated level due to polarisation effects. Polarisation 
is seen as stimulus that affects not only single individuals but whole societal groups and it can be 
triggered by national crises or simply through progress through the life-cycle. However, “the 
resulting shifts in partisanship may change the make-up of each party’s support without altering 
the relative proportions supporting each party” (Campbell et al. 1960: 151). Newer research 
showed that gradual depolarisation at the macro-level leads to decline in the share of identifiers 
among all citizens. Berglund et al. (2005: 118-119) found that overall partisanship drops, when 
the ideological distance between polar parties decreases. However, polarisation is only expected 
to foster partisanship if the polarisation of the party system is mirrored within the society. The 
effect of polarisation has been found reversed if citizens perceive parties as more distant from 
themselves on the left-right scale (Schmitt and Holmberg 1995: 114-115). 
                                                 
10 However, OLS regression of strength of party identification and pooling countries without recognizing country-
specific features might have caused problems in their study. 
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Since political parties are the most important actors in all countries under study, it is natural to 
look at party system left-right polarisation. In addition, societal polarisation shall be looked at. In 
line with the argumentation above, left-right polarisation of the society might as well have an 
impact on the individual strength of party identifications. 
H9: A high degree of left-right polarisation facilitates the development of party identifications. 
 
2.9 Control Variables 
Gender is an important variable though much of the gender gap in party identification can be 
attributed to differences in interest in politics. Furthermore, “class is clearly one of the underlying 
dimensions of party affiliation in the US” (Campbell et al. 1960: 159, 333-380). This should be 
tested as well, although Oskarson (2005) finds that the impact of class has declined in the six 
observed countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom), while 
religious voting has risen in the Netherlands and declined in the other countries. Hence, the 
Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) class scheme shall enter as control variable. Area of residence 
shall also be included to control for possible urban-rural cleavage structures. 
Since the data set contains data from a 6-year time range, it might be useful to control for 
elections years and other “turbulent years” (cf. Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 142). Because “a heavy 
dose of bad news for a major party can easily discourage young adults with a budding attachment 
to that party from growing closer to it” (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 147). Separate analyses by 
country and year did, however, not reveal significant differences. 
The intermediate level hypothesis on the impact of party families is a special case since the 
analysis will be carried out in a separate part, in chapter 5. Due to the specific nature of party 
family, it seems worthy controlling for the overall share of partisans of a country. This macro-
level variable may not be confused with the dependent variable since the share does not 
distinguish between different degrees of strength. Moreover, it can be argued that a party 
identification-friendly environment fosters individual party identifications, just like the overall 
class achievements might influence the individual pupils’ achievement, although the individual 
itself is used to generate the macro-level characteristic. 
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3 Method 
3.1 Presentation of the Data Sets 
3.1.1 European Social Survey (ESS) 
The European Social Survey (ESS 2011) cumulative data file contains all necessary information 
about the level 1 units, i.e. respondents, and the variables characterising them. It was established 
in 2002 and cumulative data are available for the first four rounds. Carried out biennially, the 
ESS is hallmarked by strict methodological rigor that is among others indicated by questionnaire 
translation that shall ensure functional equivalence (Kittilson 2007: 882). Although different 
Figure 3-1. Countries under analysis. 
Source: Own illustration. 
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sampling methods are employed due to differing available information about the universe, 
random probability sampling is the common basis for all data collection. In addition and as 
opposed to other multinational research programs, the ESS is governed by a central authority and 
can resort to central public funding. 
In terms of equivalence, four different levels exist that are cumulative in nature (Braun 2003: 
140-150). Firstly, concepts must share the same attributes in order to be comparable (construct 
equivalence). Secondly, functional equivalence is guaranteed if the instrument administered in 
different groups actually measures the same construct. Thirdly, measurement unit equivalence is 
achieved if measurement scales have the same units of measurement. Finally, full score 
equivalence makes direct comparisons of scores possible. Obviously, the most desirable form of 
equivalence is the latter one. The goal of ESS is “to achieve equivalent methods and measures, 
not identical ones” (Jowell, Kaase, Fitzgerald, and Gillian 2007: 9). Despite the very accurate and 
transparent method of data collection and procession, some degree of uncertainty can never be 
ruled out. However, since the ESS provides the most ambitious attempt so far, I confide in the 
quality of data at hand in terms of both reliability and validity. 
The cumulative data file will be used which contains 25 countries11 that have participated in at 
least two rounds (figure 3-1). Though collected at different points in time, the data will be pooled. 
Nevertheless, it has been controlled for the point in time of data collection. The variables and 
respective items remained unchanged during the whole data collection period, thus allowing for 
an unrestricted analysis that does not suffer from missing values due to item inconsistency. 
Two countries raise special attention: Firstly, Germany is a particular country because of the 
reunification in 1990. Treating the country as one single unit would distort the results and it 
seems reasonable to assume that citizens in East and West Germany differ significantly from 
each other due to different socialisation. It can be argued that East Germany is more infused with 
party identifications than other formerly communistic states in Eastern Europe, since East 
Germans were indirectly exposed to political parties in West Germany via television coverage 
(Kaase and Klingemann 1994: 152). However, Kaase and Klingemann (1994: 139) found that 
“whatever party identification in East Germany exists”, it was not quite established yet in 1994. 
                                                 
11 Turkey, Russia, Ukraine and Israel were excluded. Northern Ireland was also excluded due to the special structure 
of the party system. 
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Information on where the interview took place, are provided in the variable intewde, thus 
allowing for a clear cut division between East and West. 
Secondly, Belgium is a culturally and politically strongly divided country. The northern part 
Flanders is Dutch-speaking, whereas the southern part Wallonia is francophone. Moreover, the 
party system space in the two parts is nearly exclusively occupied by the Dutch-speaking and 
French-speaking parties respectively. This allows for a sharp division of Belgium in terms of 
level 2 variables, though the capital region is a case of special attention: In order to classify 
respondents residing in the Brussels area, the region identifier variable (regionbe) was combined 
with the variable that captures the language predominantly spoken in the household (lnghoma, 
lnghomb). 
However, these two countries remain the exceptional cases in terms of treating regions as level 2 
units. The aim of this thesis is to uncover country-specific patterns and differences and not 
differences between regions within a country12. Besides, the conceptualisation of party 
identification as product of previous experience with parties, leaders, issues and elections entails 
the influence of political contexts such as election codes, patterns of party competition and 
democratic experience. Therefore, Green and Schickler’s (2009: 196-197) critique against the 
analysis of countries that separates individuals “by arbitrary boundaries and jurisdiction” is not 
justified. 
A problem that arises due to the very large N is related to statistical methods. It is very likely that 
many of the effects will be statistically significant. However, given the high number of 
observations, one must be careful in drawing conclusions. Therefore, significance levels should 
be rather restrictive in order to avoid type I errors. Moreover, in order to enable generalisations 
from the samples to the respective universes, it is indispensable to include the design weights 
(Ganninger 2007). Table 3-1 shows the number of respondents in all countries by year of data 
collection (ESS round). To be addressed later, an equal number of observations per country shall 
enter the model in chapter 4 because all countries shall have equal weight in the regression 
analysis. 
                                                 
12 The latter approach, though attractive, cannot be implemented with the data available. The number of cases 
would not always be sufficient. Furthermore, data characterizing regions as level 2 units might be difficult to collect 
(especially polarisation and fragmentation). 
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Table 3-1. No. of respondents in the ESS cumulative data set. 
cnum Country ESS 1 ESS 2 ESS 3 ESS 4 Total 
1 Austria 2,257 2,256 2,405 NA 6,918 
2 Belgium (Flanders) 1,264 1,064 1,146 1,088 4,562 
3 Belgium (Wallonia) 635 714 652 672 2,673 
4 Bulgaria NA NA 1,400 2,230 3,630 
5 Switzerland 2,040 2,141 1,804 1,819 7,804 
6 Cyprus NA NA 995 1,215 2,210 
7 Czech Republic 1,360 3,026 NA 2,018 6,404 
8 Germany (East) 1,098 1,019 1,040 967 4,124 
9 Germany (West) 1,821 1,851 1,876 1,784 7,332 
10 Denmark 1,506 1,487 1,505 1,610 6,108 
11 Estonia NA 1,989 1,517 1,661 5,167 
12 Spain 1,729 1,663 1,876 2,576 7,844 
13 Finland 2,000 2,022 1,896 2,195 8,113 
14 France 1,503 1,806 1,986 2,073 7,368 
15 Great Britain 1,988 1,831 2,324 2,273 8,416 
16 Greece 2,566 2,406 NA 2,072 7,044 
17 Hungary 1,685 1,498 1,518 1,544 6,245 
18 Ireland 2,046 2,286 1,800 1,764 7,896 
19 Italy 1,207 1,529 NA NA 2,736 
20 Luxemburg 1,552 1,635 NA NA 3,187 
21 Netherlands 2,364 1,881 1,889 1,778 7,912 
22 Norway 2,036 1,760 1,750 1,549 7,095 
23 Poland 2,110 1,716 1,721 1,619 7,166 
24 Portugal 1,511 2,052 2,222 2,367 8,152 
25 Sweden 1,999 1,948 1,927 1,830 7,704 
26 Slovenia 1,519 1,442 1,476 1,286 5,723 
27 Slovakia NA 1,512 1,766 1,810 5,088 
 Total 39,796 44,534 38,491 41,800 164,621 
      NA: The country did not participate in the respective round. 
 
The following two paragraphs shortly present the two data sets that were used to obtain numeric 
values for the level 2 variables. 
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3.1.2 Comparative Political Data Set III (CPDS III) 
The Comparative Political Data Set III 1990-2009 (Armingeon, Careja, Weisstanner, Engler, 
Potolidis, Gerber, and Leimgruber 2011) assembles annual data for 35 OECD and/or EU member 
countries. It has been extracted from the Comparative Political Data Sets I and II which were also 
created at the University of Berne, Institute of Political Science and funded by the Swiss National 
Science Foundation. In this data set, disproportionality and the effective number of electoral 
parties are available and ready for use. However, I calculated the values for East and West 
Germany as well as Belgium(Flanders) and Belgium(Wallonia) by myself by using official 
government election statistics (see Appendix B). 
 
3.1.3 Manifesto Data Set 
Data on political party programs is provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project ([CMP]  
Volkens, Lacewell, Lehmann, Regel, Schultze, and Werner 2011). In a nutshell, party and 
electoral programs are coded by disaggregating statements into quasi-sentences that again are 
simply counted and sorted into different, a priori defined sets of policy categories (Werner, 
Lacewell, and Volkens 2010). Hence, it measures the relative importance of a political dimension 
or concept compared to other concepts. The variable relevant to the research question of this 
article is rile, i.e. the left-right value of the respective political party. I computed the polarisation 
values for the two parts of Germany and Belgium respectively by taking different vote shares into 
account (see Appendix D). 
 
3.2 Operationalisation 
3.2.1 Dependent Variable: Strength of Party Identification 
The dependent variable is based on two questions in the data set: Firstly, the simple question 
whether a respondent states a party identification or not, and secondly, the strength (or closeness) 
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of party identification. The first part of the new variable party identification is captured by the 
following question, leaving the response categories ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’, whereby those 
who answer ‘no’ will be placed at the lower end of the new variable: 
Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties? (Question 
B20a) 
It can of course be argued that this questions is somewhat vague in terms of party identification, 
because it lacks at least one of the components that Miller and Shanks (1996: 125) describe as 
essential for the measurement of party identification: an extended time horizon. Virtually, there is 
no explicit indication for the respondent to be prompted for a long-term relation to a political 
party. Thus, this instrument comes closer to rational choice theory and in connecting the running 
tally model (Thomassen and Rosema 2009: 46). When it comes to the second component, the 
sense of self-identity, the instrument takes a middle position on the continuum that is formed by 
‘considering oneself as partisan’ and simply ‘approving a political party’. In other words, feeling 
closer to a political party is a somewhat weaker attachment than considering oneself as partisan 
of a distinct political party, but feeling closer to a political party is again stronger than simply 
‘liking’ a political party. In fact, this questions does not exclude the existence of multiple party 
identifications, whereas the American instrument and the instruments used in national election 
studies explicitly preclude such constructs as multiple party identifications (for a deeper 
presentation see Schmitt 2002). 
Despite these methodological objections, this instrument appears to be the best suited for cross-
national comparisons, though it resembles the lowest common denominator (Johnston 2006: 384; 
for an overview over instruments used see Bartle and Bellucci (2009: 17-21)). Nevertheless, this 
is an advantage rather than a problem. This analysis compares 2713 countries that differ in terms 
of many characteristics. It may therefore be very wise to apply a measurement that is easily 
understood and interpreted. Moreover, Burden and Klofstad (2005) found evidence that asking 
whether a person feels partisan leads to more reliable results than asking whether a respondent 
thinks partisan. Given these supporting evidence, the ESS questions appear to be a suitable 
measure for the cross-national analysis of partisanship. 
                                                 
13 These are 23 countries plus 2 German regions (East and West) and 2 Belgian regions (Flanders and Wallonia) 
which adds up to 27 level 2 units, conveniently referred to as 27 countries. 
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The second part of the dependent variable is added by looking at the strength component of party 
identification. This is operationalised by the follow-up question directed towards those who 
stated certain closeness to a political party. The question wording is:  
How close do you feel to this party? Do you feel that you are very close, quite close, not 
close, or, not at all close? (Question B20c) 
It is both empirically and theoretically hard to define what the response category ‘not at all close’ 
means. Merely 2,000 out of 76,000 identifiers chose to call themselves ‘not at all close’ to the 
party they mentioned before. Some countries show numbers in this category that are one or only 
double digit when selecting 2,000 respondents per country. It is both empirically and theoretically 
hard to define what the difference between the response categories ‘not at all close’ and ‘not 
close’ is. There might even appear some problems with equivalence if these response categories 
are understood differently among citizens in different countries or even in the same country. In 
addition, a Brant test for all countries separately revealed that the parallel regression assumption 
is violated when applying the 5-point scale. For these reasons, I shall use the 4-point scale, in 
which the response category “not at all close” is merged with the category of “no identification”. 
Table 3-2. Frequencies of response categories of PID variable by country. 
 No identification Not close Quite close Very close Total 
Western Europe 
Austria 3,153 475 1,790 437 5,854 
Belgium (Flanders) 2,371 284 1,524 238 4,417 
Belgium (Wallonia) 1,166 326 897 138 2,527 
Switzerland 3,567 870 2,764 382 7,583 
Germany (West) 3,637 1,063 2,023 242 6,965 
France 3,505 979 2,204 332 7,020 
Luxemburg 1,734 491 530 115 2,870 
Netherlands 3,309 478 3,492 457 7,736 
Nordic Countries 
Denmark 1,801 1,123 2,470 433 5,827 
Finland 3,607 1,042 2,774 311 7,734 
Norway 2,662 913 2,996 377 6,948 
Sweden 2,615 1,012 3,172 615 7,414 
Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria 1,609 121 1,047 566 3,343 
Czech Republic 3,713 552 1,353 271 5,889 
48 
 
Germany (East) 2,515 420 883 133 3,951 
Estonia 3,055 591 1,129 113 4,888 
Hungary 3,014 195 1,937 633 5,779 
Poland 5,268 566 1,008 103 6,945 
Slovenia 3,466 541 1,105 203 5,315 
Slovakia 2,566 21 1,684 429 4,700 
Southern Europe 
Cyprus 671 118 656 624 2,069 
Spain 3,890 1,098 1,891 317 7,196 
Greece 2,932 326 2,195 797 6,250 
Italy 1,346 69 767 215 2,397 
Portugal 3,913 1,416 1,483 283 7,095 
Atlantic Europe 
Great Britain 4,412 1,158 2,319 346 8,235 
Ireland 4,450 901 1,518 315 7,184 
      
Total 79,946 17,149 47,611 9,425 154,131 
 
The dependent variable now consists of 4 ordered response categories that include both 
respondents without party identification and respondents with party identification, i.e. those that 
were able to state the strength of their attachment. Table 3-2 provides a cross-tabulation of 
country and the new PID (party identification) variable. A first glimpse indicates that there is a 
division between Eastern and Western Europe according to whether citizens state a party 
identification or not: The number of citizens identifying with a political party is considerably 
lower in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. 
 
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
It is important to note that this analysis deals with two types of explanatory variables: 
Characteristics of the level 2 units (countries)14 that shall explain between-unit variation, and 
characteristics of the level 1 units (respondents) that can theoretically explain both within-unit 
and between-unit variation. The variable codings are displayed in Appendix F. 
 
                                                 
14 The level 2 unit identifier is the variable cnum (country number). 
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Age and  Social Capital 
Some of the level 1 variables can be obtained by simple transformations of the original ESS data 
set. In particular, age is stored as variable ready to use in the data set. As it comes to integration 
into civic society or social capital, trade union membership is taken from the data set. The 
categories of being currently and being previously a member of a trade union were merged into 
one category, contrasted with all respondents that are not and have never been member of a trade 
union. 
The second part of social capital deals with being member of any other non-political organisation 
which is stores as variable in the data set. These organisations could for instance be 
environmental, sport or charity organisations. 
In addition, being member of a religious organisation and attending religious services is seen as 
integration into civic society. Here, Catholic, Protestant, Other Christian and Other Non-Christian 
respondents are contrasted with atheists. 
 
Cognitive Mobilisation 
As indicated earlier, cognitive mobilisation is seen as multi-dimensional concept with at least 
three dimensions to be defined below: Education, political involvement and media consumption. 
Education shall be operationalised as years of completed fulltime education, because collapsing 
education into ordinal level categories proved to violate the parallel regression assumption for 
various countries. 
In order to reduce the number of indicators, a factor analysis was carried out. Before I present the 
results, it had become obvious that interest in politics has a uniqueness which exceeds 97 percent. 
It was therefore dropped from the factor analysis and shall be a single individual indicator in the 
regression analysis instead. 
The variables under consideration are: 
 The amount of time spent with the TV using it as source of political information (sttvpol). 
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 The amount of time spent with the radio using it as source of political information 
(strdpol). 
 The amount of time spent with newspapers using it as source of political information 
(stnwsppol). 
 How often one makes up one’s mind about political issues (stpolcmpl). 
 How often one sees politics as complicated matter (stpoldcs). 
The variables were rectified and standardised to ensure they have a zero mean and a standard 
deviation of 1. Besides, increasing values in either of the variables now corresponds to an 
increased degree of cognitive mobilisation: e.g. a higher value in TV usage for political 
information (sttvpol) now implies that the person is more cognitively mobilised. Moreover, only 
standardisation leads factor analysis to produce reliable and meaningful results. The factor 
analysis was based on the full data set; the Eigenvalue criterion produces two factors that should 
be retained. After rotating the factors by applying the orthogonal varimax rotation, following 
factors can be distinguished: 
Table 3-3. Factor analysis of indicators of cognitive mobilisation. 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
sttvpol (TV) 0.0130 0.7260 0.4728 
strdpol (Radio) 0.0124 0.7020 0.5071 
stnwsppol (Newspaper) 0.2852 0.6488 0.4977 
stpolcmpl (Politics complicated) 0.8460 0.0502 0.2817 
stpoldcs (Making up one’s mind about politics) 0.8385 0.0770 0.2909 
 
Making up one’s mind about political issues and seeing politics as not very complicated seem to 
go hand in hand and both variables are highly correlated with the first factor while almost 
uncorrelated with the second factor. Furthermore, the media usage indicators are highly 
correlated with the second factor and hardly correlated with the first factor (cf. table 3-3). The 
uniqueness is slightly higher than for the items that form the first factor. Roughly 60 percent of 
the total variation is captured by the factor solution. Having confirmed the two dimensions, an 
index can be constructed. Instead of simply adding the variable scores, the score for each 
individual is computed by using Stata’s predict command which gives more accurate results in 
terms of the weighting of the indicators. The overall scores are then computed as the linear 
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regression result of the original score on the particular variable and the coefficient obtained 
through factor analysis: 
Table 3-4. Factor scores of involvement (factor 1) and media usage (factor 2). 
Variable Factor 1: Involvement Factor 2: Media usage 
sttvpol (TV) -0.09928 0.52219 
strdpol (Radio) -0.09614 0.50494 
stnwsppol (Newspaper) 0.10203 0.42587 
stpolcmpl (Politics complicated) 0.58242 -0.09004 
stpoldcs (Making up one’s mind about politics) 0.57320 -0.06956 
 
The newly obtained factors can be seen as media usage (factor 2) and involvement in politics 
(factor 1). In other words, a respondent’s score on the new variable involvement is constructed as 
the linear combination of the products between each variable score and the respective correlation 
with the factor displayed in table 3-4. The same applies then to the second factor which 
represents media usage. 
 
Trust 
Similar to cognitive mobilisation, trust can be regarded as multi-dimensional. Therefore, a second 
factor analysis was conducted according to the same procedure described above. In total, 6 items 
were regarded as important for summarizing trust (whereby trust in political parties was omitted 
due to a high number of missings and obvious variance inflation problems): 
 Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful (stppltrst). 
 Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair (stpplfair). 
 Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves (stpplhlp). 
 Trust in the country’s parliament (sttrstprl). 
 Trust in the country’s legal system (sttrstlgl). 
 Trust in politicians (sttrstplt). 
Again, two factors are retained because they have an Eigenvalue that exceeds 1. The rotated 
factor solution is shown below: 
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Table 3-5. Factor analysis of indicators of trust. 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
stppltrst (trust in people) 0.2417 0.7993 0.3028 
stpplfair (people are fair) 0.1725 0.8332 0.2760 
stpplhlp (people helpful) 0.1698 0.7884 0.3496 
sttrstprl (trust in parliament) 0.8869 0.1653 0.1860 
sttrstlgl (trust in the legal system) 0.8093 0.1891 0.3092 
sttrstplt (trust in politicians) 0.8541 0.1986 0.2310 
 
The mean uniqueness is about 30 percent (cf. table 3-5), slightly lower for the variables that form 
the first factor. As obvious, trust in the parliament, in politicians and the legal system show high 
loadings on the first factor and low on the second, whereas the three first indicators show high 
loading on the second factor  and low ones on the first. The two factors amount for roughly 72 
percent of the total variation. 
Table 3-6. Factor scores of institutional trust (factor 1) and interpersonal trust (factor 2). 
Variable Factor 1: Institutional trust Factor 2: Interpersonal trust 
stppltrst (trust in people) -0.06651 0.41894 
stpplfair (people are fair) -0.11205 0.45624 
stpplhlp (people helpful) -0.10246 0.43006 
sttrstprl (trust in parliament) 0.43655 -0.11914 
sttrstlgl (trust in the legal system) 0.38894 -0.08580 
sttrstplt (trust in politicians) 0.41074 -0.09117 
 
The index is then constructed in the same way as mentioned above. Then, trust in the legal 
system has slightly less weight then trust in the parliament since the coefficient is lower (0.39 
compared to 0.44, cf. table 3-6). In conclusion, the first factor clearly subsumes trust in 
institutions, while the second factor represents interpersonal trust. Obviously, politicians are no 
institutions like the parliament or the legal system. However, politicians usually act as entities on 
behalf of an institution such as the parliament or the government. They can therefore be grouped 
into institutional rather than interpersonal trust. The new variables were constructed in the same 
way as the involvement and media usage variables under the cognitive mobilisation part. 
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Party Families 
Classifying political parties across countries into party families is a complex matter. As Mair and 
Mudde (1998) suggest, party family classification should be based both on common origins of 
parties and on common party ideologies. I follow the classification scheme used by Klingemann 
(2005: 26) who applied this classification to six West European countries; however, I performed 
my own classification based on programme and ideological considerations. Information on 
Eastern Europe were partly provided by Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Toka (1999). 
The resulting party family groups are displayed in table 3-7. At a first glimpse, the categories 
“radical right” and “left-socialist” might be the ‘fuzziest’ ones. 
Table 3-7. Party families. 
Label Meaning Issue vs. Cleavage 
COM Communist Cleavage 
LS Left-Socialist Issue 
SO Social democratic Cleavage 
EC Ecological Issue 
LI Liberal Cleavage 
CO Conservative Cleavage 
REL Religious Cleavage 
R Radical right Issue 
REG Regional/Ethnical Issue 
AGR Agrarian/Centre Cleavage 
SI Single issue Issue 
 
The classification is based on certain features of party programs and ideologies. Communist 
parties advocate a shift of the political systems towards a communist state. Left-socialist parties 
are reformed left parties that stand for moderate socialism and politics including public spending 
and welfare distribution by the state. They typically evolved as splinters of socialist or communist 
parties (Klingemann 2005: 26). Social democratic parties denote political parties that are based 
on the original labour cleavage and therefore based on the labour movement. Usually, social 
democratic parties are the catch-all party on the left side of the political spectrum. Ecological 
parties are parties of newer origin, usually emerged in the late 20th century in reaction to 
environmental and climate issue. Therefore, they are rather issue- than cleavage-based. Liberal 
parties are the modern form of traditional middle class bourgeois parties with strong emphasis on 
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individual and economic liberalism and freedom. Conservative parties espouse traditional 
institutions and aim at maintaining the status quo of the society. This is usually connected to 
economic liberalism and limited public spending on redistribution. Religious parties can be seen 
as political arm of one of the major religions, basically the Roman Catholic and/or the Protestant 
church inside a country. Radical right parties are characterised by nationalism, populist rhetoric, 
especially towards immigrants and minorities, and emphasis on specific features of the country’s 
culture. Regional and ethnical parties represent either regional entities within a country which 
want to gain more autonomy/influence, or ethnical minorities within a country that want to 
protect and/or expand their rights. Centre and agrarian parties used to represent peasants and have 
become the representation of farmers. These parties pursue centrist policies. Single issue parties 
do not offer a broad political programme but occupy a political niche or gap that is not 
thoroughly covered by major parties. The complete classification is shown in Appendix C. 
In terms of hypotheses 5a and 5b, the classical cleavage-based party families are social 
democratic (SOC), communist (COM), liberal (LI), conservative (CO), religious (REL) and 
agrarian/centre parties (AGR). Conversely, issue-based parties emerged later than the parties 
mentioned above and focus more on certain controversial issues: Ecological (ECO) parties focus 
on environmental protection and sustainability; radical right parties (R) emphasise immigration as 
important aspect in politics, namely negatively connoted; regional and ethnical parties (REG) 
fight for autonomy and more extensive rights for their region and ethnicity respectively; single 
issue parties pursue only one aim; however, there is only one party, DESUS in Slovenia, that is 
placed in this category. Hence, it is merged with the category ‘other parties’ in the analysis part in 
chapter 5. Left socialist parties play a somewhat ambiguous role: On the one hand, they usually 
separated from the social democratic or communist party; on the other hand, the reasons for 
separation were usually more situational (e.g. EC/EU, extent of social redistribution, issues of 
war and peace). It is therefore not easy to place this party family. Nevertheless, since the reasons 
for separation appeared to be strong enough for a complete break-up with the mother party, I 
argue for treating left socialist parties as issue-based rather than cleavage-based. 
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Maturity of Democracy 
Four hypotheses that deal with contextual characteristics were presented in the previous chapter. 
The first one denotes the maturity of the democratic system. A three-category ordinal variable has 
been fitted that distinguishes “old” or established democratic systems such as the United 
Kingdom, Norway or France from “medium” old democracies that experienced transition in the 
1970s (Greece, Spain and Portugal). The third category consists of the newly democratised 
countries in central and Eastern Europe. In the analysis chapter and in line with table 3-8, this 
variable will consist of 2 dummy variables: matdem1 for old democracies and matdem3 for new 
democracies, leaving medium old democracies the reference category. 
The peculiarity of the history of Eastern European countries leads to an important effect: 
According to the lifetime learning model, the level of commitment should increase with age (cf. 
hypothesis 6). Since the dictatorial nature of state hampered this development (cf. Green et al. 
2002: 165), younger people are expected to be more likely stating a party identification. 
Therefore, a cross-level interaction between maturity of democratic system and individual age 
should be created and tested. 
Table 3-8. Maturity of democratic systems. 
 𝑴𝑫𝒋 Country 
Old democracies 1 Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Belgium (Wallonia), Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (West), Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom 
Medium old democracies 2 Greece, Portugal, Spain 
Young democracies 3 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany (East), Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
 
Party System Fragmentation 
The second hypothesis captures the extent of party fragmentation in the electorate. Fragmentation 
can be operationalised as effective number of parties represented in parliament. As mentioned 
before, the fragmentation within the electorate is a purer measure of the extent of different 
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tendencies that exist inside of a society than the respective number in terms of parliamentary 
representation, for that is rather a product of electoral codes and arrangements which should be 
discussed later. The number of relevant parties N for country j can be calculated by the following 
formula, proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979): 
𝑁𝑗 =  1∑ 𝑣𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1  
where 𝑣𝑖 corresponds to the proportion of votes for party i. Relevant data can be found in the 
Comparative Political Data Set III, where vote shares for parties were collected from 1990 to 
2009. As a general rule, parties that attained more than 2 percent of the votes are included. Tests 
have shown that this threshold does not impair the validity of this measure (not shown here). Due 
to the specific nature of the data set, the issue of time frame arises. I argue that the fragmentation 
should be averaged over the time period when ESS was conducted; the number of elections is 
also taken into account when calculating the fragmentation15. This variable will then be called 
fragmentation in the analysis. 
 
Electoral Disproportionality 
The third hypothesis deals with the degree of distortion produced by the electoral code. Since 
primary arrangements or party tests do not exist in the run-up to European elections, I suggest 
Gallagher’s index of disproportionality (Gallagher 1991; Lijphart 1999): 
𝐺𝑗 = �12�(𝑣𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖)2𝑛
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑣𝑖 is the vote percentage and 𝑠𝑖 the seat percentage for party i. Data is available in the 
Comparative Political Data Set III. The variable is denoted disprop in the analysis. 
                                                 
15 In addition, fragmentation might not only have an immediate effect on the electorate at a given point in time t, 
but it can be argued that fragmentation takes the position of a lagged variable. In other words, electoral 
fragmentation at time t-1 (𝐹t−1 ) may lead to differences in the level of party identification at time t which is the 
time when ESS was conducted. Hence, an alternative measure of fragmentation that represents an extended time 
frame could be tested in the model as well. However, due to limited space, this is omitted. 
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Figure 3-3. Mean disproportionality in the 27 level 2 units. 
Source: Comparative Political Dataset III and own calculations. 
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Figure 3-2. Mean effective number of electoral parties in the 27 level 2 units. 
Source: Comparative Political Dataset III and own calculations. 
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In order to ensure consistency, I argue for averaging over the time period which ESS was 
conducted, thus data from 2002 to 2009 will be used, taking the number of elections into account 
that took place within that period. The mean values of effective number of electoral parties and 
disproportionality are shown in figures 3-2 and 3-3 respectively. 
 
Polarisation 
The fourth hypothesis touches the polarisation of the political sphere which is dominated by 
political parties. In that reasoning, political parties and their standpoints are seen as mirrors of 
views and attitudes that exist inside the society. This reflects a more bottom-up approach16 of 
political participation which can indeed be questioned. However, in that view, political parties 
absorb current persisting lines of attitudes in the electorate and base their party program on these 
attitudes in order to ensure favourable election results. In other words, a party that represents 
attitudes and values that are not mirrored in society will hardly be a successful one. 
Given that the dimension of left-right is still the main conflict line in European countries, the 
placement on this axis serves as proxy for the polarisation of party systems as a whole17. Four 
operationalisations have been applied in the literature: Firstly, using Manifesto data to extrapolate 
the total party system polarisation (Klingemann 1995); secondly, using voters’ or partisans’ self-
placement on the left-right scale (e.g. Berglund et al. 2005); thirdly, calculating polarisation as 
difference between the two major (polar or largest block) parties’ polarisation again by looking at 
Manifesto data (e.g. Berglund et al. 2005); finally, simply measuring the vote share of anti-
system parties as Lane and Ersson (1999: 140) describe. I shall apply the first two approaches for 
two reasons: First of all, both measures include the total polarisation of the party system as a 
whole whereas the two latter measures only focus on parts of the party system, e.g. the biggest 
block parties, anti-system or polar parties. This might be error-prone since stable a priori criteria 
for these terms need to be defined; in addition, the classification of parties into these concepts 
might be less stable over time. Secondly, the two alternative measures I chose to apply use 
                                                 
16 The respective top-down approach: looking at people’s left-right placement. 
17 In a nutshell, left materialist orientations emphasise the responsibility of government to facilitate solidarity and 
economic equality; conversely, right materialist value orientations highlight the supremacy of the market (Knutsen 
1995). 
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different data material, i.e. survey data and manifesto data. Thus, the other two measures become 
redundant due to their lack of accuracy mentioned above. It shall be underscored that the two 
approaches to be presented below denote party system polarisation, whereas the third and last 
approach to be addressed represents left-right polarisation in the society. 
Table 3-9. The left-right scale as obtained by Manifesto Data. 
Code Policy Dimension — Code Policy Dimension per104 Military: Positive per103 Anti-Imperialism: Positive 
+  +  
per201 Freedom and Human Rights per105 Military: Negative 
+  +  
per203 Constitutionalism: Positive per106 Peace: Positive 
+  +  
per305 Political Authority per107 Internationalism: Positive 
+  +  
per401 Free Enterprise per403 Market Regulation 
+  +  
per402 Incentives per404 Economic Planning 
+  +  
per407 Protectionism: Negative per406 Protectionism: Positive 
+  +  
per414 Economic Orthodoxy per412 Controlled Economy 
+  +  
per505 Welfare State Limitation per413 Nationalisation 
+  +  
per601 National Way of Life: Positive per504 Welfare State Expansion 
+  +  
per603 Traditional Morality: Positive per506 Education Expansion 
+  +  
per605 Law and Order per701 Labour Groups: Positive 
+  +  
per606 Social Harmony per202 Democracy 
 
Firstly, I will take a look at the manifesto data-based measure. Since the manifesto data set relies 
on party programmes, one has to be aware of that fact that party standpoints articulated in party 
programmes and party behaviour in the decision-making process do not always correspond; 
therefore, party programmes do only serve as proxy for party behaviour, although it cannot 
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account for variations and deviations produced by political compromises and negotiations. The 
Manifesto data set contains an index of the left-right dimension (see Appendix D) which I will 
apply (CMP 2011: 20-21). In a nutshell, a “left” position is indicated by emphasis on democracy, 
planned or mixed economy, cultural libertarianism, welfare state expansion, peace and deténte, 
whereas a “right” position includes a strong emphasis on freedom and human rights, market 
economy, traditional morality/law and order, welfare state limitation, military strength. The 
indicator provided by the Manifesto Data Set is the difference between the sums of the “right” 
and “left” party policy categories, whereupon actual percentages are used (table 3-9, for more 
details regarding the policy categories, see CMP (2011)). These characteristic policy categories 
were obtained by applying factor analysis (Budge 2001: 217). It is obvious that the policy 
categories are not always mirrored on either side; for example, there is no “left” counterpart to 
“Constitutionalism: Positive”. In other words, a “left” position does not correspond to 
“constitutionalism: negative” which means that the two indices consist of partly very different 
categories because the Manifesto measure18 is based on issue salience. Unfortunately, manifesto 
data are not always provided for the whole period under study (2002-2009, see Appendix D). 
This first indicator for party system polarisation based on Manifesto data will be called 
polaris_MD. 
Secondly, I shall use the voter-based left-right placement for political parties. In a first country-
wise step, the left-right self-placement mean value is calculated based on the electorate; i.e. those 
respondents who claim having voted for the political party they name. Afterwards, for all 
political parties in a country the mean left-right position of their voters is calculated. In addition, 
the vote share for each party is obtained based on the number of respondents that voted for the 
respective party. 
Both MD-based and survey-based party system polarisation measures have in common that they 
rely on the same formula for polarisation once the mean polarisation for the party system and the 
values for the parties are obtained. I advocate the use of a measure formulated by Huber (1989) 
because his formula does not rely on squaring the differences from the mean as opposed to the 
measure by Taylor and Herman (1971: 34). Hence, polarisation is measured more accurately and 
                                                 
18 I modified the left-right variable in order to attenuate the effect of parties that are not represented with a 
polarisation value. Hence, I rescaled the measure in case the total share of votes did not add up to 100 percent. 
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not influenced by artificially applied mathematical operations such as squaring. Polarisation is 
then related to 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 as left-right policy position and vote share respectively of party i, 𝑝 as 
mean left-right policy position of the party system as a whole and n as number of parties, thus 
capturing the total polarisation of the party systems: 
𝑃𝑗 = �[𝑣𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
× |𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝|] 
The presented formula operates with absolute values instead of squares and/or square roots and 
yields the values in Figure. This survey-based measure shall be called polaris_survey. 
Furthermore, one additional measure shall be applied that is related to a society’s mean left-right 
value. It is also based on the survey data at hand: For each country, the mean left-right value is 
calculated by taking all respondents into account. Since the mean is a measure of central 
tendency, it might be possible that maximally polarised societies (e.g. the two halves of the 
population are placed on either pole of the scale) and minimally polarised societies (e.g. all 
respondents have the middle value 5) lead to the same polarisation value. Therefore, the standard 
deviation of the left-right self-placement scale shall serve as proxy for polarisation inside the 
society, thus not taking political parties directly into account. This last measure is denoted with 
polaris_sdleftright. 
Admittedly, there are some facts worth noting: The measure is not directly related to the political 
sphere, i.e. not to political parties. However, it might be the case that citizens perceive large 
polarisation inside the society and therefore choose to support parties as partisans. I implicitly 
then assume that the mobilisation effect would be more visible for citizens around the middle 
area of the scale since a wider range of parties is available at this position. 
According to the Manifesto-based measure (figure 3-4), the three Scandinavian countries are 
among the 5 most polarised party systems and score high on fragmentation as well. This 
corresponds to Sartori’s (2005: 112) theoretical expectation that high fragmentation (seen as a 
party systems with more than 5 parties) lead to polarised pluralism. However, according to the 
survey-based measures (figures 3-5 and 3-6), the Scandinavian countries lie in the middle, 
whereas Eastern and Southern European countries score high on polarisation. 
62 
 
 
Figure 3-4. Mean party system polarisation in the 27 level 2 units based on Manifesto Data. 
Source: Manifesto Data Set and own calculations. 
 
Figure 3-5. Mean party system polarisation in the 27 level 2 units based on ESS data. 
Source: Own calculations based on ESS data. 
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Figure 3-6. Left-right polarisation of society. 
Source: Own calculations based on ESS data. 
 
Table 3-10. Correlations between the four level 2 variables. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Disproportionalitya 1.00      
2 Effective number of electoral partiesa -0.21 1.00     
3 Party system polarisationa (MD) -0.22 0.31 1.00    
4 Left-right polarisationa (SD ESS) -0.04 0.14 -0.13 1.00   
5 Survey based party system polarisationa (ESS) -0.03 -0.03 0.20 0.83 1.00  
6 Maturity of democracyb 0.32 -0.14 0.01 0.29 0.14 1.00 
N=27 countries 
a Pearson’s r 
b Kendall’s tau b 
   
  
 
 
Table 3-10 summarises the correlations between each of the four country level variables19. With 
one exception, the variables are only modestly correlated (|𝑟| < .30); however, maturity of 
democracy and disproportionality are modestly stronger correlated, indicated by 𝜏𝑏 = .32 since 
                                                 
19 The numerical values of the level 2 variables are displayed in Appendix E. 
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maturity of democracy is treated as ordinal level variable. The two survey-based measures of 
polarisation are strongly correlated at . 8, whereas the third Manifesto-based measure is strongly 
correlated to neither of the survey-based measure. This is an indication that there are different 
concepts represented in the survey-based measures and the Manifesto-based respectively. In 
order to avoid variance inflation, these three measures will be tested separately on at a time. 
 
Figure 3-7. Overview over the level 2 variables, grouped in geographic regions. 
Figure 3-7 summarises the five operationalisations according to geographic regions. The Nordic 
countries score high on the effective number of political parties and very low on 
disproportionality. However, the countries score highest on Manifesto-based polarisation, 
whereas the other measures of polarisation indicate a middle position. The Atlantic countries 
score highest on disproportionality and lowest on all three polarisation measures as well as the 
effective number of parties. Western, Southern and Eastern European countries show very similar 
patterns in terms of the level 2 variables. 
 
3.2.3 Control Variables 
The Erikson and Goldthorpe social class classification was obtained by running the syntax based 
on the ISCO codes and proposed by Leiulfsrud, Bison, and Jensberg (2005). The Erikson and 
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Goldthorpe (1992) class scheme divides society, or rather the labour force, into seven categories 
(table 3-11). Though they originally aimed at distinguishing between employers, self-employed 
workers and employees, they did not consistently keep this division, since large employers and 
higher grade service persons are merged into one group. Therefore, it is rather difficult to 
maintain a clear-cut division between workers and employers. Basically, the following classes II, 
III, V, VI and VII are formed exclusively by employees, whereas the classes I and IVc are to 
some extent a mixture of both employers and employees and self-employed workers respectively. 
In other words, the key feature is the distinction between various types of employees. 
Table 3-11. Class scheme after Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). 
Code Erikson/Goldthorpe label Class label 
0 I Higher level service class 
1 II Lower level service class 
2 IIIa + IIIb Routine non-manual 
3 IVa + IVb Petty bourgeoisie 
4 V+VI Skilled workers 
5 VIIa + VIIb Unskilled workers 
6 IVc Farmers 
 
As mentioned earlier, there are 7 classes in the class scheme applied in the analysis; the 
description of the respective class is based on Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 36-41). First of all, 
the service class is divided into two different classes, the higher level (I) and the lower level 
service class (II). The first class (I), the higher level service class, includes high-grade 
professionals, administrators and officials as well as managers in large industrial companies and 
large proprietors as mentioned above. Positions in this class carry the largest responsibilities 
(Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 43). On the contrary, the second class (II) consists of lower-grade 
professionals, higher-grade technicians, managers in small companies and supervisors of non-
manual employees. The third class (III as merger of IIIa and IIIb) unites lower and higher level 
non-manual workers such as sales personnel, rank-and-file service workers who fulfil clerical 
tasks. Class IIIb was added in order to capture “low-skill non-manual positions largely occupied 
by women” (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 44). Small proprietors with and without employees as 
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well as artisans are grouped together in the fourth class (IV as merger of IVa and IVb), named 
petty bourgeoisie. The specific feature about it is that they either employ a small number of 
employees or are self-employed in their own small company. Finally, the last three classes deal 
with different kinds of workers. The fifth class (V+VI) consists of skilled workers, i.e. lower-
grade technicians, supervisors of manual workers and skilled manual workers. Unskilled workers, 
however, find themselves placed in the sixth class (VIIa and VIIb). Individuals placed in either 
group V or VI do not work in the primary sector, but in the secondary. As similar to class II, there 
is the least need to grant autonomy in the workflow to employees, whereas skilled workers fulfil 
craft-specific tasks (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 43, footnote 16). Finally, workers engaged in 
agriculture are being placed in the seventh class (IVc). Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 44) justify 
this distinction with the fact that the primary form of property is land. 
In addition to class, area of residence (urban vs. rural) shall serve as control variable for the 
classic cleavage mentioned earlier. Gender completes the group of control variables that enter at 
an early stage since these variables denote the very stable social background as shown in the life 
time learning model. 
It can be expected that the variables have differing time horizons. That is why a sequential 
regression analysis will be used that takes these differences into account. Figure 3-8 displays the 
proposed regression sequence. At first, invariant individual characteristics enter the model that is 
basically gender, birth cohort, education, social class and area of residence which cannot be 
influences by other factors outside the individual. In a second step, social capital is included in 
the model. Afterwards, long-term political attitudes and political behaviour enter into the model, 
such as trust, political interest and media consumption. Actually some of these variables might 
produce endogeneity problems since it can be argued that certain opinions and attitudes are 
consequences rather than causes. Therefore, the results in this model shall be looked at with 
caution. Nevertheless, I argue that long-term political play a remarkable role and cannot be 
discarded. In a final step, the contextual level 2 variables complete the model. This model follows 
the life time learning model and the time horizons proposed there. 
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Figure 3-8. Causal model. 
 
3.3 Model 
Multilevel models connect a certain outcome, here the strength of party identification, to not only 
individual but also context characteristics in which an individual is located. Figure 3-9 
I: Invariant Individual 
Characteristics: e.g. 
Gender, Birth Cohort 
II: Acquired Skills 
and Attributes: e.g. 
Education, Social 
Class, Social Capital 
III: Long-term Political 
Orientations: e.g. Political 
Interest, Media Usage 
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Figure 3-9. Separate effects of individual and contextual effects (a) 
and cross-level interaction (b). 
Source: Snijders and Bosker (1999: 11) 
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exemplifies how a multilevel model relates both individual (X) and contextual (Z) variables to a 
certain outcome (Y). 
The analysis deals with the strength of party identification which is coded as 4-category ordinal 
variable. Based on this ordinal data structure, an ordered logistic multilevel regression is the 
method of choice. 
The rationale behind this model is the introduction of cumulative probabilities. For the three 
distinct outcomes as presented above, the following assumptions can be made: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 = 0) = 𝑝1 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 = 1) = 𝑝2 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 = 2) = 𝑝3 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 = 3) = 𝑝4 
Having made this distinction, the relation between these three probabilities can be seen as 
cumulative (Hox 2010: 142): 
𝑝1
∗ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 = 0) = 𝑝1 
𝑝2
∗ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 ≤ 1) = 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 
𝑝3
∗ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 ≤ 2) = 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 + 𝑝3 = 1 
𝑝4
∗ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 ≤ 3) = 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 + 𝑝3 + 𝑝4 = 1 
The last equation is not necessary since probabilities can only vary between 0 and 1, thus 𝑝4∗ can 
simply be found by subtracting 𝑝3∗,𝑝2∗ and 𝑝1∗ from 1. 
The general family of statistical techniques is again the family of logistic regressions, using the 
logistic link function. Instead of using binomial probabilities, the cumulative probabilities are the 
outcome (Hox 2010: 142-143). 𝜂𝑐 is the underlying latent variable, strength of party 
identification, that defines the link function: 
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𝜂𝑐 = log � 𝑝𝑐∗1 − 𝑝𝑐∗� = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 �𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 ≤ 𝑐)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 > 𝑐)� = logit(𝑝𝑐∗) 
Then, a random intercept-only model can be written as follows (Hox 2010: 143): 
𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑐 = 𝜃𝑐 + 𝑢0𝑗, 
where 𝜃𝑐 is an intercept that is category-specific (i.e. threshold). The key assumption is the 
assumption of proportional odds, i.e. the independent variables affect the odds ratio in the same 
way for every category 𝑐. 
Based on that, following relations hold: 
𝑦𝑖 = �0,1,2,3,
if 𝜂𝑖 ≤ 𝜃1          if 𝜃1 < 𝜂𝑖 ≤ 𝜃2          if 𝜃2 < 𝜂𝑖 ≤ 𝜃3if 𝜃3 < 𝜂𝑖  
In particular, the equations will take the following form (Hox 2010: 145; Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002: 321-324), since the first threshold is 0 (𝜃1 = 0): 
Level 1: 
𝜂1𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 ∗ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 
𝜂2𝑖𝑗 = 𝜃2 + 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 ∗ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 
𝜂3𝑖𝑗 = 𝜃3 + 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 ∗ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 
𝜂4𝑖𝑗 = 𝜃4 + 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 ∗ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 
where the subscript i denotes an individual’s value on a given variable 𝑥 in country j. In terms of 
the analysis that will be carried out in this paper, the 𝑥’s are the level 1 variables described above, 
such as educational achievement, gender. Random intercept models will be fitted that take the 
general form on level 2 given below: 
Level 2: 
𝛽𝑜𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 ∗ 𝐴𝐷𝑗 + 𝛾02 ∗ 𝑁𝑗 + 𝛾03 ∗ 𝐺𝑗 + 𝛾04 ∗ 𝑃𝑗 + 𝑢𝑜𝑗 
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𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾1𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑗 
Figure 3-10 shows exemplary the relationship between logistic density function and the 
thresholds. Since ordered logistic multilevel regression is not part of the Stata 12 MP routines, I 
downloaded and incorporated the GLLAMM package which is outlined and explained in Rabe-
Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles (2004; 2005). Practical guidelines for the model were taken from 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008). 
 
0
0.5
-4 -2 0 2 4
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𝜃 4 𝜃 3 𝜃 2 
Figure 3-10. Thresholds and observed responses for ordinal logit model. 
Source: Own figure after Hox (2010: 144). 
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4 Empirical Analysis: The Strength of 
Party Identification 
 
In order to test the hypotheses set up in the methodological chapter, a sequential two level ordinal 
logistic regression model was fitted. As mentioned before, the results are weighted with the 
design weight what ensures correct results in a statistical sense. The model numbers in the result 
table header correspond to the numbers in the causal model. Metric variables were centred by 
subtracting the variable’s grand mean which is presented in table 4-1. The factor solutions are 
obviously not centred since they already have a mean that is zero. 
Table 4-1. Summary statistics of the metric variables. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
eduyears 52,728  12.3 4.0 0.0 25.0 
age 52,728  47.8 16.9 14.0 102.0 
religattend 52,728  4.4 1.5 0.0 6.0 
involvement 52,728  0.0 1.0 -2.9 3.1 
institut.trust 52,728  0.0 1.0 -2.8 3.4 
interpers.trust 52,728  -0.1 1.0 -3.6 3.2 
mediausage 52,728  0.0 1.0 -2.0 7.1 
fragmentation 52,728  4.6 1.1 2.8 7.1 
disprop 52,728  5.3 4.2 0.7 19.4 
polaris_MD 52,728  11.2 5.9 2.1 27.0 
polaris_sdleftright 52,728  2.1 0.3 1.8 3.1 
polaris_survey 52,728  1.3 0.4 0.5 2.3 
 
Since the number of respondents varies largely between countries, I shall base the analysis on 
roughly 2,000 respondents per country. Thus, countries present in all rounds are not 
overrepresented and cannot distort the results. The number 2,000 is based on the fact that the 
smallest number of observations per country is slightly below this threshold. I then drew a 
random sample of 2,000 observations per country from the data set. Table 4-2 shows the 
regression results of the ordinal logistic multilevel regression on the strength of party 
identification. The baseline intra-class correlation coefficient is estimated as 0.0651, i.e. 6.51 
percent of the total variation is caused by differences between countries. It must be noted that this  
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Table 4-2. Regression results for the level 1 predictors. 
pid Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
gender  -0.214*** -0.195*** 0.037 
(Female)  (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) 
age  0.020*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 
(Age)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
eduyears  0.040*** 0.032*** -0.010* 
(Education in years)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
egp1  -0.038 -0.043 0.002 
(Lower level service class)  (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) 
egp2  -0.228*** -0.193*** -0.042 
(Petty bourgeoisie)  (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) 
egp3  -0.151** -0.081 0.031 
(Routine non-manual)  (0.057) (0.059) (0.058) 
egp4  -0.273*** -0.242*** 0.005 
(Skilled workers)  (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
egp5  -0.319*** -0.277*** -0.014 
(Unskilled workers)  (0.049) (0.047) (0.048) 
egp6  0.049 0.088 0.234*** 
(Farmers)  (0.066) (0.064) (0.066) 
area1  0.015 0.066 0.009 
(City)  (0.048) (0.054) (0.038) 
area2  -0.003 0.019 0.000 
(Town)  (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) 
religdenom1   0.136*** 0.129** 
(Roman Catholic)   (0.037) (0.039) 
religdenom2   0.259*** 0.222*** 
(Protestant)   (0.040) (0.038) 
religdenom3   0.022 0.076 
(Other Christian)   (0.097) (0.092) 
religdenom4   0.061 -0.029 
(Other non-Christian)   (0.197) (0.169) 
religattend   -0.024 -0.010 
(Church attendance)   (0.016) (0.016) 
tradeu1   0.240*** 0.176*** 
(Trade union member)   (0.029) (0.022) 
organis1   0.600*** 0.397*** 
(Organisation member)   (0.060) (0.054) 
polinter1    0.585*** 
(Hardly)    (0.037) 
polinter2    1.246*** 
(Quite)    (0.049) 
polinter3    1.942*** 
(Very)    (0.049) 
involvement    0.173*** 
(Factor: involvement in politics)    (0.018) 
institut.trust    0.242*** 
(Factor: institutional trust)    (0.016) 
interpers.trust    0.072*** 
(Factor: interpersonal trust)    (0.014) 
mediausage    0.063*** 
(Factor: media usage)    (0.016) 
_cut11 -0.075 -0.367*** -0.147* 0.975*** 
 (0.087) (0.085) (0.064) (0.062) 
_cut12 0.396*** 0.120 0.349*** 1.516*** 
 (0.101) (0.1099) (0.038) (0.045) 
_cut13 2.638*** 2.413*** 2.670*** 4.009*** 
 (0.158) (0.164) (0.081) (0.104) 
N 52,728 52,728 52,728 52,728 
LL -58835.740 -57778.250 -57295.48 -54503.98 
Pseudo-R2 (Mc-Fadden) — 0.0180 0.0262 0.0736 
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke) — 0.0440 0.0636 0.1697 
Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001  
(Robust standard errors in parentheses) 
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general effect is estimated on average for all countries under study simultaneously; however, the 
slope for age is fixed, thus assumed to be equal for all countries. 
 
4.1 The Level 1 Hypotheses 
4.1.1 The Importance of Age 
As formulated in hypothesis 1, there is indeed evidence for the importance of age as predictor of 
party identification. In model 1, age has a total causal positive effect of .020 on partisan strength. 
In other words, each increase in age by one year above the mean age causes an increase in the 
logged strength of party identification of .020 of being in a higher level of partisan strength. 
Conversely, the predicted probability of holding a party decreases by .020 per age year below the 
mean age, given that all other variables in the model are held constant. The direct causal effect of 
age is .011 and only half of that total effect, whereas the other half is indirect via social capital 
variables and attitude variables. 
Therefore, there might be countries, where the general effect of age is lower or higher. In 
conclusion, however, the hypothesis can be regarded as confirmed: Younger citizens state a party 
identification less often than older citizens; and if they state one, they are expected to hold a 
weaker attachment to their preferred political party. This is very much in line with expectation of 
the life time learning model. Increasing experience with elections, parties and programmes leads 
to stronger attachments. Nevertheless, this is not a deterministic trend in personal party 
identification as Campbell et al. (1960) claimed. It simply means that today’s older generations 
did at one point in time acquire a party identification and maintained it, whereas the younger 
generations have not (yet) caught up to the same extent. 
 
4.1.2 The Impact of Social Capital 
In the analysis, there were basically three types of indicators of social embeddedness: Firstly, 
membership based on religion and religious denomination; secondly, membership in work-related 
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organisations; thirdly, working in other, non-political organisations. Let’s first have a look at 
religious belongings. There is evidence that especially Christians, i.e. Protestants and Catholics 
tend to be closer partisans compared to atheists; the estimated and highly significant total causal 
effects in model 2 are around .259 for Protestants, .136 for Catholics. In addition, this also 
provides evidence for the importance of cleavages since both Catholics and Protestants tend to be 
more partisan than other religious denominations and atheists. Attending religious services less 
often has a negative insignificant total causal effect of -.024 on the strength of party 
identification. This slightly significant effect remains insignificant when political attitudes enter 
the model; accordingly, the effects of religious denomination decrease when controlling for 
political attitudes in model 3. 
The second indicator is related to integration into trade unions as organisation for protection of 
labour right and wage bargaining. Both current and previous trade union members show stronger 
attachments compared to non-members. The common total causal effect is .240 and slightly 
stronger than the effect of religious denomination. Though also the institutionalised churches 
have been facing a loss of members, the trend is stronger for trade unions. The sequential analysis 
shows that trade union membership is connected to some of the attitudes that enter the model in 
step 3. Therefore, the estimates drop to a direct effect of .176, indicating that the total causal 
effect is mediated through political attitudes. The direct effect remains larger than the indirect. 
Finally, an activity related neither to work nor to religion is represented by whether a person has 
worked in an organisation other than a political party. The estimated effect in model 2 is .600, 
indicating that active citizens are expected to be more partisan compared to inactive citizens in 
the sense mentioned above. Here as well, the original total causal effect decreases when political 
attitudes are controlled to .397 in model 3. 
In conclusion, the hypothesis about integration into civil society can be confirmed, based on the 
indicators presented. This seems to be a more general disposition that is connected to 
“integration”: Since members of religious organisations, other organisations or trade unions are 
members due to certain belief systems or, in case of the latter one, issue or ideology-related 
attitudes. Joining such an organisation is therefore connected to a wish of change or the wish for 
meeting likeminded people what might have a reinforcing effect on the attitudes that once 
brought an individual there. Moreover, institutionalised forms penetrate their members with 
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messages and standpoints of the institution itself in one way or another. Hence, if the institution 
is somehow associated with a political party, it may serve as transmission channel through with 
political parties gain support. This has been observed with trade unions and the churches. Though 
meant in a slightly different sense, Robert Putnam’s term of ‘social capital’ that has a value 
(Putnam 2000: 19-20) does fit here as well: Active people that are highly integrated usually hold 
party identifications.  
 
4.1.3 Cognitive Mobilisation 
Hypothesis 3 proposes a positive effect of cognitive mobilisation on partisanship. Four different 
components were distinguished in the model of which each should increase the probability of 
having a party identification: Educational achievement, interest in politics, political involvement 
and media usage. 
First of all, education plays an ambiguous role. In the first model that includes long-term socio-
demographic background variables, the total causal effect of education is in accordance with the 
hypothesis 3, i.e. each one year increase in education above the mean education, i.e. becoming 
more cognitively mobilised, increases the log odds of being placed in a higher level of partisan 
strength (0.040). Surprisingly, this positive significant effect is being reversed when political 
attitudes are included in model 3. Each increase in education is now related to a slightly 
decreasing probability of being placed in a higher level of partisan strength (-.010). It is relatively 
unusual that an effect remains significant, while the sign is changing. However, this estimate for 
education indicates the “pure” effect of education when all closely related effects are controlled 
for. In a more simple way, if high education is not correlated to interest in politics any more, 
education itself leads to rather weaker attachments. To sum up, hypothesis 3 in terms of 
education holds when political attitudes are not taken into account. If so, education affects 
partisan strength negatively and is then in line with the original cognitive mobilisation 
hypothesis, although the effect is tiny. However, the total causal effect indicates that increasing 
educational achievement fosters party identifications which is in line with hypothesis 3. 
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Secondly, the well-proven effect of interest in politics can be confirmed here as well; moreover, 
the effect of political interest is by far the largest one. Political interest appears to be almost 
linearly related to the strength of partisanship. People with low interest in politics are expected to 
hold a stronger party identification (.585) compared to uninterested persons; the same applies to 
moderately and highly interested people (1.246 and 1.942 respectively). Being open towards 
topics on the political agenda and persons engaged in the political arena actually leads to a closer 
relation to a political party – hypothesis 3 can therefore be seen as confirmed with respect to 
interest in politics. Moreover, since the factor analysis revealed the specific nature of interest in 
politics compared to the ability variables below, it can also be confirmed that interest in political 
affairs is an independent pillar of cognitive mobilisation along with media usage and educational 
achievement as I theorised. 
The same patterns can be seen according to political involvement. In general, the factor solution 
that represents involvement into politics has a positive effect on the strength of party 
identification. Each one unit increase leads to a .173 higher log odds for being placed in a higher 
level of partisan strength. It is important to note that the effect is highly significant and different 
from the effects produced by interest in politics. Therefore again, the distinction between these 
two dimensions seems fruitful and valuable. In conclusion, being interested in politics and being 
involved with political issues are two distinct variables with significant and strong effect on the 
strength of party identification. Hypothesis 3 is therefore confirmed with regard to involvement. 
Finally, media usage is captured by a factor solution that represents television, radio and 
newspaper usage at the same time. Using media actively for the purpose of political information 
increases the likelihood of having a stronger party attachment by .063. Though the effect is 
significant, it appears to be far less important than the other components of cognitive mobilisation 
which confirms hypothesis 3 for media as well. 
To sum up, intimidating evidence has invalidated the theory of cognitive mobilisation in many 
respects. Only education seems to play the role that it was been assumed by Dalton (1984) and 
Dalton and Wattenberg (2000), although they did not formulate their theory for taking political 
attitudes into account. The other components, interest in politics, involvement and media 
consumption point directly in the other direction: They actually increase the strength of party 
identification among citizens of the 27 European countries under study 
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4.1.4 Trust 
The factor analysis resulted in two factors of which one represents interpersonal and the other 
institutional trust. The main focus, however, lies on institutional rather than interpersonal trust. 
Bearing qualms about endogeneity in mind, there is a positive effect (.242) of institutional trust 
which is formed by trust in parliament, legal system and politicians, on the strength of party 
identification. I advocate the view that some basic level of institutional trust must be present 
before a person starts to identify with a political party; that is what the variable in the analysis 
should represent. The results table supports this view. Having trust in institutions increases the 
likelihood of stating a party identification. 
The second part of the trust factor analysis shows a small significant effect of interpersonal trust 
on the strength of party identification (.072) which seems almost negligible. Though I laid out 
reasons for controlling for interpersonal trust, I regard interpersonal trust not as immediately 
important as trust in institutions. Anyhow, the analysis shows that basically the institutional trust 
components is very important, whereas the interpersonal component taken into account for 
control purposes seem to be far less important. The hypotheses 4a and 4b are confirmed. 
 
4.1.5 Comments on the Control Variables 
I shall now turn to some findings based on the control variables. There is confirmation that 
gender itself does not have any direct influence on the strength of party identification; rather, the 
initially negative effect indicating that women tend to hold weaker party identifications than their 
male counterparts, becomes insignificant when controlling for political attitudes and political 
behaviour. Thus, it is primarily due to these differences in attitudes connected to party 
identification that women have weaker attachments than men. 
The Erikson and Goldthorpe class variable shows significant effects when it first enters into the 
regression model. However, these initially negative total causal effects become insignificant as 
soon as one controls for political attitudes. Thus class membership must be closely correlated 
with certain attitudes and opinions that mediate its effect. Exceptional cases are only farmers who 
tend to have a positive and significant influence on the strength of party identification; their 
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probability of stating a stronger party identification increases by .234 compared to higher 
controllers (class I). This might be the reason why the domicile identifier is insignificant all the 
way: Area of residence (area) does not have any significant effect on the strength of party 
identification. It indicates that mere residence in a geographical sense is no longer a suitable 
proxy for social status and/or political attitudes. 
I shall now turn to the analysis of the level 2 variables that represent the country-specific features 
of each society and/or party system. 
 
4.2 The Level 2 Hypotheses 
First of all, the correlations between partisan strength and each of single level 2 predictors are 
displayed in table 4-3. 
Table 4-3. Correlation coefficients between strength of party identification and the level 2 
variables. 
 pid 
fragmentation 𝜂 = 0.005 
disprop 𝜂 = 0.004 
polaris_MD 𝜂 = 0.006 
polaris_survey 𝜂 = 0.024 
polaris_sdleftright 𝜂 = 0.029 
matdem 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑉 =  0.087  
 
Fragmentation, disproportionality and Manifesto-based polarisation are almost uncorrelated with 
the strength of party identification. The correlations for the two survey-based measures are not 
very large either; however, they are to some extent mirroring the importance of these measures 
compared to the ones named before. Since maturity of democracy is not a matric variable, the 
Cramer’s V value is shown instead of the eta-coefficient. There is obviously a correlation but it 
turns out to be very weak since values below .1 are usually seen as very small correlation. Before 
turning to the regression analysis, it should be noted that the magnitude of the correlations found 
cannot be compared to the effect sizes of the regression analysis. 
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Table 4-4 shows the results for the level 2 variables. There are three different columns that 
indicate the three different polarisation measure mentioned in the other chapters: 
Model 4a: polaris_MD is the Manifesto-based party system polarisation variable. 
Model 4b: polaris_survey is the ESS-based party system polarisation variable. 
Model 4c: polaris_sdleftright is the ESS-based society polarisation variable (the standard 
deviation (sd) of the societal left-right variable). 
The output for level 1 variables is omitted since the effect sizes remain unchanged. The full 
models can be found in Appendix G. 
Table 4-4. Regression results for the level 2 variables. 
pid 4a 4b 4c 
(regression output for the level 1 variables omitted) 
fragmentation 0.139*** 0.067*** 0.042*** 
(Fragmentation 𝑁𝑗) (0.019) (0.013) (0.011) 
disprop -0.004 0.003 0.005 
(Disproportionality 𝐺𝑗) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
matdem1 -0.293*** -0.227** -0.332*** 
(Old democracies 𝐴𝐷1𝑗) (0.035) (0.081) (0.072) 
matdem3 -0.257*** -0.359*** -0.662*** 
(New democracies 𝐴𝐷3𝑗) (0.037) (0.082) (0.067) 
eastage 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(Interaction 𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝐴𝐷3𝑗) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
polaris_MD -0.008*   
(Polarisation: MD 𝑃𝑗) (0.004)   
polaris_survey  0.906***  
(Polarisation: Survey 𝑃𝑗)  (0.053)  
polaris_sdleftright   1.306*** 
(Polarisation: Left-right 𝑃𝑗)   (0.049) 
_cut11 0.792*** 0.824*** 0.574*** 
 (0.067) (0.081) (0.061) 
_cut12 1.332*** 1.364*** 1.128*** 
 (0.056) (0.089) (0.049) 
_cut13 3.826*** 3.858*** 3.663*** 
 (0.109) (0.137) (0.096) 
N 52,728 52,728 52,728 
LL -54495.75 -54480.94 -54480.06 
Pseudo-R2 (Mc-
Fadden) 
0.0738 0.0740 0.0740 
Pseudo-R2 
(Nagelkerke) 
0.1700 0.1706 0.1706 
ICC 0.1485 0.0439 0.0465 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (Robust standard errors in parentheses) 
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4.2.1 Maturity of Democracy and Disproportionality 
First of all, maturity of democracy shows significant results in all three cases: The reference 
category is medium old democracies such as Spain. In accordance with hypothesis 6, citizens of 
new democracies (matdem3) tend to show weaker attachments compared to medium old 
democracies. However, also old democracies (matdem1) follow the same pattern: Being citizen 
of an established democracy decreases the log odds of being place in a higher level of strength by 
.293 in model 4a, .227 in model 4b and .332 in model 4c. Hence, there is no linear trend 
concerning the strength of party identification and the maturity of a democratic system. 
Accordingly, the differences between old and new democracies seem to be insignificant, as 
opposed to the difference compared to the medium old democracies. This pattern appears in 
connection with all polarisation measures, although the negative effect of young democracies is 
largest (-.662) in model 4c that includes the measure based on the standard deviation of the left-
right axis. In conclusion, there is evidence that young democracies have weaker party 
identifications than medium old democracies, whereas the difference to old democracies is far 
from being significant, since also old democracies have weaker attachments than medium old 
ones. 
As opposed to the expectation, there appears to be only a tiny effect based on the cross-level 
interaction between individual age and maturity of democracy: Citizens from newly democratised 
countries are expected to have a slightly increased probability of holding a party identification if 
their age increases by one unit above the grand mean, compared to medium old and old 
established democracies. Conversely, young people in Eastern European countries are not 
necessarily closer to political parties than their parents or more general generations that were 
socialised under socialist regimes. In other words, the younger generations are not or not yet as 
close to institutionalised forms of political processes as their older counterparts. Despite this 
finding, the general hypothesis 1 of age as predictor for strength of party identification is 
confirmed as explained above, even though the cross-level interaction effect appears to be tiny 
and not significant. 
Disproportionality of the electoral system seems to have virtually no effect on the strength of 
partisan attachments no matter what polarisation measure is applied. The effect of 
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disproportionality is insignificant all the way. In conclusion, hypothesis 8 can be seen as 
invalidated since the estimates oscillate around 0. 
 
4.2.2 Fragmentation 
Hypothesis 7 dealt with party system fragmentation. Fragmentation operationalised as effective 
number of electoral parties actually has a significant effect on the strength of individual 
partisanship in all models which is contradicting my hypothesis: Higher fragmentation leads to 
stronger party identifications. The effect is largest in model 4a that includes Manifesto-based 
polarisation (.139) and slightly lower in models 4b and 4c (.067 and .042 respectively). Thus, the 
more parties compete for seats in the national parliament, the stronger the party attachments. It 
can be argued that the more parties, the more likely one finds a political party which represents 
one’s opinions and attitudes. Moreover, the chance for niche attitudes to be covered by niche 
parties in the party system is much higher. In conclusion, hypothesis 7 does not receive support. 
On the contrary, fragmentation fosters stronger party identifications. 
 
4.2.3 Polarisation 
As obvious from the table of results, the Manifesto-based polarisation measure (model 4a) has 
only a very tiny effect on the individual strength of partisanship. Conversely, the inclusion of this 
measure actually increases the level 2 variation and at the same time the ICC to 0.1485. The 
estimated slightly significant effect is -.008, thus indicating that increasing polarisation decreases 
partisan strength. However, it might be the case that party programmes might not be a suitable 
approximation to party system polarisation as a whole; in addition, some problems with the 
available data were outlined in the method chapter. Moreover, the effect is very small at the 
border of being insignificant. 
Fortunately, both the survey-based party-related measure and the survey-based left-right measure 
show strongly significant effects. Recall that these effects were closely related to each other with 
𝑟 ≈ .8. Hypothesis 9 can therefore be confirmed: Polarisation of both society and party system 
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have a positive effect on individual partisan strength. Each increase in polarisation above the 
grand mean leads to an expected increase of .906 (party-system polarisation) and 1.306 (societal 
polarisation) respectively in the log odds of being placed in a higher level of partisan strength. 
Therefore, the expected positive effect of polarisation in terms of clear political alternatives 
provided by the parties in question pays off. It obviously matters whether a party system is 
polarised because it is much more at stake in case the opposite party of the one an individual 
favours comes into power. 
Generally, the individual-based measures tend to be far better predictors than the party 
programme-based measure. Surprisingly, it does not play a major role whether the left-right 
polarisation measure is being mediated by parties that represent the position on the axis, or not. 
This basically indicates that individuals in the 27 level 2 units are usually well represented by 
their political parties in terms of left-right placement. 
 
4.2.4 Overall Model Fit 
Taken together, model 4b seems to be the model that performs best due to two reasons. Firstly, 
the ICC is decreased to its lowest value (.0439). In other words, the model performs best at 
reducing country-specific variation in the strength of party identification, whereas the ICC 
actually increases when Manifesto-based polarisation is included in the model20. Secondly, both 
Pseudo-R2 are highest for this model21. The Pseudo-R2 values indicate the predictive power 
which the four different variable groups yield. The largest increase in the Pseudo-R2 occurs due 
to the inclusion of political attitudes (from model 2 to model 3), i.e. interest in politics and 
political involvement, followed by socio-demographics and social capital. At the latter end, the 
level 2 variables increase the Pseudo-R2 values only very little. 
                                                 
20 Level 1 variance is assumed to be constant and following a logistic distribution with 𝑣𝑎𝑟 = 𝜋2
3
, thus the ICC is 
estimated by 𝐼𝐶𝐶 = 𝜓11�
𝜓11�+
𝜋2
3
. 
21 The values are indeed highest for this model though a difference between model 4b and model 4c becomes 
obvious on the fifth position after the decimal point. 
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In order to see how well the best model 4b performs, the table below (table 4-5) shows the 
predicted and actual party identifications. Roughly 43.21 percent of the observations were 
correctly classified given the final model that includes the survey-based and party-related 
polarisation measure. This is an increase of about seven percentage points compared to the 
intercept-only model (36.04 percent). 
Table 4-5. Predicted versus actual party identification for the null and the full model 4b. 
 Actual PID 
  No party 
identification 
Not close Quite close Very close Total 
  Null Full Null Full Null Full Null Full Null Full 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
PI
D 
No party 
identification 
12,519 14,886 2,820 2,786 8,648 6,902 1,989 1,438 25,976 26,012 
Not close 2,883 2,646 628 695 1,894 1,883 438 422 5,843 5,646 
Quite close 8,586 6,922 1,964 1,949 5,607 6,767 1,149 1,528 17,306 17,166 
Very close 1,727 1,261 427 409 1,199 1,796 250 438 3,603 3,904 
Total 25,715 5,839 17,348 3,826 52,728 
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5 Empirical Analysis: The Impact of 
Party Families 
 
Table  5-3 below shows regression for the strength of party identification as dependent variable 
and party family as predictor variable. In addition, the overall share of a country’s party 
identifiers obtained through calculations based on the ESS cumulative data file entered the model 
as centred control variable that is located at level 2 (table 5-1; the variable displayed has not been 
centred yet). In model 1, only the party family variable and the share of identifiers are included, 
whereas model 2 includes all level 1 variables as seen in the previous chapter. The output, 
however, has been omitted here and the full regression table is presented in Appendix H. As 
opposed to the analyses presented in the previous chapter, no limitation has been made according 
to the number of respondents per country that enter the model. 
 
Table 5-1. Summary statistics of the variable share. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
share 61,280 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.7 
 
Since the main focus is placed on the intermediate level variable party family, it does not appear 
necessary to limit the number of level 1 units per level 2 unit. Rather, the regression is more an 
analysis of European party families and their identifier’s strength of party identification across 
country boundaries. In addition, the level 2 variables from the previous chapter are not included 
in this analysis, for they cause serious variance inflation problems in connection with the variable 
that captures the share of identifiers. Table 5-2 shows the number of respondents per party 
family. Clearly, social democratic and conservative partisans outnumber the other party families, 
since their combined share of identifiers exceeds 50 percent. 
Furthermore, the original 4 response categories are retained. The reason for doing so is rather 
straightforward: There is no need for a distinction between ‘no identification’ and ‘not at all 
close’ in this analysis because non-identifiers are not part of the model anyways. However, 
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respondents in the category ‘not at all close’ are able to name a party they feel closer to and can 
be seen as lower end of the strength scale in this case. 
Table 5-2. Distribution of partisans on the party families. 
parfam Frequency Percent 
Communist 1,635 2.67 
Left socialist 3,714 6.06 
Social democratic 19,758 32.24 
Ecological 3,182 5.19 
Liberal 7,394 12.07 
Conservative 11,328 18.49 
Religious 7,727 12.61 
Far right 3,345 5.46 
Regional/ethnical 755 1.23 
Agrarian/Centre 1,331 2.17 
Single Issue/Other 1,111 1.81 
Total 61,280 100.00 
 
 
The reference category is social democratic parties. Single issue and other parties were merged 
into the last category, other parties. As obvious from model 1, only three effects of party families 
are significant, compared to the partisan strength of identifiers with social democratic parties. 
First of all and highly significant, identifiers with communist parties tend to have stronger party 
identifications than any other party family. The respective coefficient is .536 and significant at 
the 0.1 percent level. Conversely, identifiers of both liberal and radical right parties tend to hold 
weaker attachments, -.167 and -.122 respectively compared to social democratic partisans. 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b suggested that issue-based parties or old cleavages parties still foster 
strong attachments. None of these hypotheses seem to be confirmed. Significant differences can 
only be traced for communist parties as well as liberal and far-right parties. In other words, there 
seems to be no division between issue-based and cleavage-based parties in terms of how strong 
their partisans identify with their preferred political party. 
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Table 5-3. Regression results for the strength component in relation to party family. 
 strength Null model Model 1 
(excluding level 1 
variables) 
Model 2 
(including level 1 
variables, output 
omitted) 
Parfam1 Communist  0.536*** 0.519*** 
   (0.108) (0.130) 
Parfam2 Left socialist  0.063 0.074 
   (0.070) (0.066) 
Parfam3 Social democratic 
(reference category) 
   
Parfam4 Ecologic  -0.044 0.051 
   (0.058) (0.062) 
Parfam5 Liberal  -0.167** -0.204*** 
   (0.048) (0.052) 
Parfam6 Conservative  0.035 0.002 
   (0.033) (0.047) 
Parfam7 Religious  0.081 -0.003 
   (0.066) (0.057) 
Parfam8 Radical right  -0.122** 0.054 
   (0.044) (0.050) 
Parfam9 Regional/Ethnical  0.110 0.197 
   (0.097) (0.102) 
Parfam10 Agrarian/Centre  0.100 0.050 
   (0.111) (0.110) 
Parfam11 Single Issue/Other  -0.007 0.041 
   (0.090) (0.105) 
 share  2.715*** 1.669*** 
 (Share of identifiers)  (0.695) (0.455) 
 _cut11 -3.838*** -2.514*** -3.404*** 
  (0.207) (0.267) (0.218) 
 _cut12 -1.132*** 0.195 -0.617*** 
  (0.150) (0.251) (0.173) 
 _cut13 2.220*** 3.554*** 2.983*** 
  (0.123) (0.287) (0.175) 
N  61,280 61,280 61,280 
LL  -56437.39 -56351.497 -53796.102 
Pseudo-R2 (McFadden) — 0.0015 0.0468 
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke) — 0.0033 0.0982 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
Neither is any trend in partisan strength visible regarding extreme parties, such as communist and 
radical right parties: Communists tend to have stronger attachments, whereas partisans of radical 
right parties tend to have weaker attachments than social democratic partisans. It is far from self-
explanatory what distinguishes communist and radical right parties so that the estimated effect on 
the strength of party identification is so different. It might be the case that the estimate for 
communist parties is largely a product of strong attachments towards the communist parties in 
Eastern Europe that still persist among citizens that played an active and supporting role inside 
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the communist systems before 1990. It might be the case that radical right parties are attracting 
protest groups to a larger extent than communist parties. This again indicates volatility due to 
negative feelings towards other parties rather than positive attachments to the radical right party. 
Further studies might shed light on this division between positive and negative party 
identifications addressed earlier. 
Interestingly, when consulting the results of model 2, the effect for radical right parties has 
become insignificant. This means that the total causal effect of this variable is mediated by some 
of the level 1 variables, possibly trust, interest in politics and cognitive mobilisation. The effects 
for communist and liberal parties remain significant and maintain their strength even when 
controlled for the level 1 variables. 
The share of partisans which characterizes a country has a significant and strong effect on the 
strength of party identifications. In other words, the higher the number of party identifiers in a 
country, the stronger the attachments on individual level. The effect is estimated with 2.715  in 
model 1 and drops to 1.669 in model 2 which means that the share of partisans is closely related 
to individual-level characteristics. 
Nevertheless, since partisans of radical right parties score lower in terms of their partisan 
strength, hypothesis 5a is rejected, at least for this kind of parties. The picture is not clearly 
supporting hypothesis 5b either. 
Table 5-4. Predicted versus actual strength. 
 Actual PID 
  Not at all 
close 
Not close Quite close Very close Total 
  Null Full Null Full Null Full Null Full Null Full 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
PI
D 
Not at all 
close 
29 22 299 272 884 711 182 133 1,394 1,138 
Not close 308 281 2,984 2,754 8,428 7,606 1,650 1,523 13,370 12,164 
Quite close 908 920 8,362 8,915 23,830 25,172 4,548 4,804 37,648 39,811 
Very close 154 176 1,923 1,627 5,667 5,320 1,124 1,044 8,868 8,167 
Total 1,399 13,568 38,809 7,504 61,280 
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The model fit statistics indicate that party family accounts for very little of the total variation in 
the strength of party identification. Moreover, the strongest predictor appears to be the control 
variable on level 2 (share) that represents the share of party identifiers within each country. Given 
a mere 0.002 and 0.003 for the Pseudo-R2, it becomes obvious that party family is not a very 
powerful predictor of partisan strength. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that strength indeed 
varies partly significantly across party family. 
A closer look at the classification table 5-4 reveals that model 1 which includes only share and 
party family contributes very little: The percentage of correctly classified observations, i.e. the 
trace of the matrix divided by the total number of observations, increases by roughly one and a 
half percentage points from 45,64 percent in the null model to only 47,31 percent in the model at 
hand. Surprisingly, the model performs only better at classifying observations into the “quite 
close” category whereas the number of correctly classified observations actually decreases. 
In conclusion, there is an effect of party family on the strength of party identification. However, 
this effect is tiny and applies to partisans of communist parties that have stronger ties to their 
parties and liberal and radical right party identifiers that have weaker attachments to their parties 
than social democratic identifiers. The other party families do not show any significant difference 
in strength compared to social democratic identifiers. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The thesis aimed at answering the question which individual and contextual factors exhibit 
influence on the individual strength of partisanship. To address this question, the cumulative ESS 
data file was used that allows for valid conclusions across the countries under study for the time 
period the survey was conducted. It has been pointed out that the ESS programme is 
characterised by strict methodological rigor which ensures the reliability of the results generated. 
On the individual level, biological age and social capital were confirmed as important positive 
sources of influence on party identification. The older and more integrated a citizen, the more 
likely becomes a party identification in the first place and the stronger the attachment. Age can 
here be seen as proxy for experience with elections, parties and the political system as a whole: 
Young voters have to acquaint themselves with the political sphere which counteracts strong 
attachments. In addition, integration into civic society, such as churches, trade unions and other 
organisation seem to foster party identifications. Though the link between organisation and 
political party may vary to a great extent, these organisations serve either as transmission channel 
between individual and party or as space for communication about political issues between peers. 
Nevertheless, cross pressure might blur the effect of these organisations; for instance, those who 
actively engage in an organisation tend to be those who have goals and clear opinions on how to 
achieve these goals. 
The theory of cognitive mobilisation was granted greater emphasis in the analysis chapter. It has 
been confirmed that the concept itself is multidimensional and that all components – educational 
achievement, interest in politics, involvement in politics and media usage – have significant and 
distinguishable effects on the strength of party identification. Apart from educational 
achievement, the other components seem to contradict the original theory of cognitive 
mobilisation. Instead of watering down and washing away party identification, interest, 
involvement and media usage actually increase the probability of stating a (strong) attachment. 
Thus, the expectation of a growing number of independent voters is not met by the data. In other 
words, it is not cognitive mobilisation that has triggered dealignment. 
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Some notes of caution were issued in terms of trust. However, the data suggest that trust in 
institutions has a positive effect on partisanship. This seems to fit with the expectation that some 
basic level of trust is required before any kind of identification can emerge. Nevertheless, the 
causal relationship is not necessarily that clear since party identification itself may increase the 
level of trust over time. In order to analyse this, a panel analysis must be carried out. 
When it comes to the contextual variables under analysis, the picture is somewhat less univocal. 
First of all, the bivariate correlations between each of the variables and the strength of party 
identification indicate weak to moderate relationships. There is some indication that medium old 
democracies tend to have citizens with slightly stronger identifications; moreover, fragmentation 
seems to have a positive effect on party attachments. These two findings contradict the original 
hypotheses formulated in the theory chapter. As mentioned earlier, the positive effect of 
fragmentation might occur due to greater range of parties ‘available for identification’ so that 
even niche interest combinations might find representation. Electoral disproportionality caused 
by restrictive electoral codes appears to be insignificant and negligible as predictor for individual 
party attachments. In other words, it is not pivotal whether an electoral system is highly 
disproportional – such as the one in the United Kingdom – or particularly proportional. 
Polarisation was scrutinised by applying three different indicators of which two had strong effects 
on partisanship. The Manifesto-based measure, however, exhibits no advantage in explaining 
partisan strength; it actually increases the ICC and is therefore unsuitable for prediction. Some 
deficiencies of the measure were pointed out earlier; it might be the case that party programmes 
are too far from the concept ‘party system polarisation’ in this particular case. The two other 
measures were based on survey data: The first one used the left-right placement of party voters as 
measure for total party system polarisation, whereas the second one relied on the standard 
deviation of a country’s mean left-right score. Both measures are strongly correlated and produce 
similar results: The more polarised a society, the stronger the attachments to political parties. As 
explained earlier, the clearer or more visible the differences between political parties, the easier is 
it to spot the party which represents one’s own beliefs and attitudes. Furthermore, it is more at 
stake if any other than the preferred party wins the election. On the whole, contributions were 
made in terms of social class, religion, political interest, cognitive mobilisation and a variety of 
contextual variables (the red shapes in figure 6-1). 
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The last part of the analysis dealt with the impact of party families on party identification. 
Treated as intermediate level variable, party family proved to be a rather weak predictor of 
partisan strength in terms of explanatory power. However, especially communist and liberal 
partisans stick out: The first ones due to their increased strength and the latter one due to their 
decreased strength compared to social democratic partisans. I argued that the communist group 
might be the most cohesive one and that Eastern European partisans of the former ruling 
communist parties before the fall of the wall might contribute to generating this result. 
Having summarised the main findings, there is still much research to be carried out on party 
identification (the blue shapes in figure 6-1). Despite the discussion about the usability of party 
identification as predictor of party choice, there is little doubt that the concept itself is fruitful 
since it is usually connected to many other features of the political process. In addition, a 
politically mature and responsible citizen is a key characteristic (or rather key precondition) of 
the model of participatory democracy. To a certain degree, also elite theories of democracy 
demand a certain awareness of politics by the citizens that form a society. Therefore, party 
identification and its connected attributes can be regarded as important for democratic societies. 
So far, we know much about which individual factors raise or decrease the probability of stating a 
party identification. Moreover, there is much evidence that partisanship has declined in most 
Western societies, though it is still a matter of debate how to interpret such a decline. It has been 
tried to identify the reasons for the decline, among others cognitive mobilisation, modernisation, 
shrinking societal milieus, and weakening ties between civil society and political parties. Some of 
the proposed explanations perform well in explaining the decline; nevertheless, none of the 
approaches is able to explain the decline sufficiently. 
Though the thesis contributes to the nature of partisanship and answers some important questions, 
it also poses new questions and possible subjects for further research. Some of the elements in 
figure 6-1 were covered in the analysis, such as class, religion, political interest and contextual 
variables. From a scientific point of view, there are a variety of interesting questions that raise 
interest. For instance, how do personality traits influence the strength and direction of party 
identifications? Gerber and his colleagues (2011) analysed the importance of extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability and openness to experience on party 
identification. They found support for their expectation that the “Big Five” personality traits do 
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have an impact on both strength and direction of party identification in the United States. In line 
with previous research, it appears appealing to compare their results across the Atlantic. 
Furthermore, the financial crisis and the following debt crisis that has hit Europe might be 
reflected in the strength of party identifications, especially in those countries that have been 
suffering most. The new ESS round 5 has been released recently, though incomplete. It appears 
very fascinating to scrutinise possible impacts on party identifications with results from the time 
before the crisis started. 
 
Figure 6-1. Driving forces for party identifications. 
Source: Own illustration. 
As a suggestion, further studies and surveys might consider treating the strength of party 
identification as continuous variable which makes it easier to analyse it. Though ordered logistic 
regression proves to be a powerful analytical tool, immediate understanding could be improved 
by introducing a strength scale that ranges for example from 0 to 10, indicating increasing 
partisan strength. 
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Appendix 
A. Table of Countries and Country Codes 
 
Country code Country Geographical/Cultural belonging 
AT Austria Western Europe 
BE (F) Belgium (Flanders) Western Europe 
BE (W) Belgium (Wallonia) Western Europe 
BG Bulgaria Eastern Europe 
CH Switzerland Western Europe 
CY Cyprus Southern Europe 
CZ Czech Republic Eastern Europe 
DE (E) Germany (East) Eastern Europe 
DE (W) Germany (West) Western Europe 
DK Denmark Nordic 
EE Estonia Eastern Europe 
ES Spain Southern Europe 
FI Finland Nordic 
FR France Western Europe 
GB United Kingdom Atlantic Europe 
GR Greece Southern Europe 
HU Hungary Eastern Europe 
IE Ireland Atlantic Europe 
IT Italy Southern Europe 
LU Luxemburg Western Europe 
NL Netherlands Western Europe 
NO Norway Nordic 
PL Poland Eastern Europe 
PT Portugal Southern Europe 
SE Sweden Nordic 
SI Slovenia Eastern Europe 
SK Slovakia Eastern Europe 
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B. Disproportionality and Fragmentation Data for Germany and Belgium 
 
 GERMANYa BELGIUMb 
 WEST EAST FLANDERS WALLONIA 
 Eff_N Disp_G Eff_N Disp_G Eff_N Disp_G Eff_N Disp_G 
2002 3,03 1,99 3,73 12,51 5,82 2,57 6,11 3,99 
2003 3,03 1,99 3,73 12,51 4,97 5,44 5,34 7,01 
2004 3,03 1,99 3,73 12,51 4,97 5,44 5,34 7,01 
2005 3,49 1,08 4,41 3,95 4,97 5,44 5,34 7,01 
2006 3,49 1,08 4,41 3,95 4,97 5,44 5,34 7,01 
2007 3,49 1,08 4,41 3,95 4,98 3,79 5,42 5,27 
2008 3,49 1,08 4,41 3,95 4,98 3,79 5,42 5,27 
2009 4,46 3,52 4,74 5,08 4,98 3,79 5,42 5,27 
 
a: Data used to generate the effective number of electoral parties and disproportionality for East 
and West Germany can be obtained online 
at http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/fruehere_bundestagswahlen/.  
b: Data used to generate the effective number of electoral parties and disproportionality for East 
and West Germany can be obtained online at http://electionresources.org/be/. 
 
104 
 
C. Party Family Classification 
 
 Freq. 
Code 
Label 
CO
M
 
LS 
SO
 
EC 
LI 
CO
 
REL 
R 
REG
 
AG
R 
SI 
The Nordic countries            
prtclDK                         
DENMARK 1242 1 Socialdemokraterne - the 
Danish social democtrats     X         
  300 2 Det Radikale Venstre - 
Danish Social-Liberal Party       X       
  338 3 Det Konservative Folkeparti - 
Conservative         X      
  555 4 SF- Socialistisk Folkeparti - 
the Socialist People's Party   X          
  303 5 Dansk Folkeparti - Danish 
peoples party           X    
  62 6 Kristendemokraterne - 
Christian democtrats           X     
  1199 7 Venstre, Danmarks Liberale 
Parti - Venstre        X       
  103 8 Enhedslisten, De Rød-Grønne 
- The Red-Green Alliance   X           
  47 20 Other                    
prtclFI                         
FINLAND 883 1 The National Coalition Party           X      
  208 2 The Swedish People´s Party 
(SPP)             X   
  9 3 Liberals, (The liberal party of 
Finland)        X       
  947 4 The Centre Party                X  
  90 5 TRUE Finns               X    
  177 6 Christian Democrats             X     
  532 7 The Green League          X        
  1056 8 Finnish Social Democratic 
Party        X         
  274 9 The Left Alliance        X          
  11 10 Communist Parties        X           
  31 20 Other                    
prtclNO                         
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 Freq. 
Code 
Label 
CO
M
 
LS 
SO
 
EC 
LI 
CO
 
REL 
R 
REG
 
AG
R 
SI 
NORWAY 55 1 Red Electoral Alliance (RV)      X           
  573 2 Socialist left party (SV)       X          
  1337 3 Labour Party (A)         X         
  155 4 Liberal Party (V)           X       
  326 5 Christian Democratic Party 
(Krf)            X     
  247 6 Centre Party (Sp)                X  
  772 7 Conservative Party (H)            X      
  839 8 Progress Party (FrP)              X    
  40 20 Other                    
prtclSE                         
SWEDEN 281 1 Centre Party                 X  
  477 2 Liberals             X       
  264 3 Christian Democrats             X     
  315 4 Green Party           X        
  1094 5 Conservative             X      
  1934 6 Social Democrats         X         
  411 7 Left          X          
  115 20 Other                    
Central and Western Europe           
 
prtclAT                  
AUSTRIA 1017 1 SPÖ   X         
  1036 2 ÖVP       X     
  180 3 FPÖ        X    
  13 4 BZÖ        X    
  564 5 GRÜNE    X        
  12 6 LIF     X       
  7 7 KPÖ X           
  15 20 Other            
prtclBE                         
BELGIUM 212 1 Groen!            X        
FLANDERS 659 2 CD&V + N-VA       X     
  25 4 Lijst Dedecker  (NOW LDD)        X    
  428 5 SP.A. + Vlaams progressieven   X         
  237 7 Vlaams Belang               X    
  407 8 Open VLD + Vivant     X       
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 Freq. 
Code 
Label 
CO
M
 
LS 
SO
 
EC 
LI 
CO
 
REL 
R 
REG
 
AG
R 
SI 
 97 20 Other            
                 
BELGIUM 225 9 CDH               X     
WALLONIA 232 10 Ecolo            X        
  16 11 Front National               X    
  414 12 MR             X       
  496 13 PS           X         
  27 20 Other                    
prtclFR                         
FRANCE 40 1 CPNT (Chasse, Pêche, Nature 
et Traditions)        X      
  146 2 FN (Front National)              X    
  88 3 LCR (Ligue Communiste 
Révolutionnaire)     X           
  57 4 LO (Lutte Ouvrière)       X          
  51 5 MPF (Mouvement pour la 
France)          X      
  186 6 PC (Parti Communiste)      X           
  21 7 Nouveau Centre            X       
  17 8 PRG (Parti Radical de 
Gauche)         X       
  1369 9 PS (Parti Socialiste)        X         
  1036 10 UMP (Union pour la Majorité 
Présidentielle)        X      
  300 11 UDF-MoDem (Mouvement 
Democrate)          X       
  237 12 Les Verts           X        
  62 13 Autres mouvements 
écologistes         X        
  22 14 MNR (Mouvement national 
républicain)            X    
  44 20 Others                    
prtclDE                  
GERMANY 1598 1 Social Democratic Party 
(SPD)   X         
WEST 1733 2 Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU/CSU)       X     
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 Freq. 
Code 
Label 
CO
M
 
LS 
SO
 
EC 
LI 
CO
 
REL 
R 
REG
 
AG
R 
SI 
  695 3 Green Party (Bündnis90/Die 
Grünen)    X        
  246 4 Liberal Democratic Party 
(FDP)     X       
  473 5 The Left Party.Party of 
Democratic Socialism 
(Linkspartei.PDS)  
X          
  43 6 Republican Party 
(Republikaner)        X    
  30 7 National Democratic 
Party/German Peoples Union 
(NPD/DVU)        
X    
  65 20 Other Party            
prtclLU                  
LUXEMBURG 515 1 Parti Chrétien Social (PCS)            X     
  336 2 Parti Socialiste Ouvrier 
Luxembourgeois (PSOL)       X         
  194 3 Parti Démocrate (PD)           X       
  162 4 Les Verts (GRENG)    X        
  28 5 La Gauche (LENK)  X          
  49 6 Comité d'action pour la 
Démocratie et Justice sociale 
(=ADR)      
X      
  8 20 Autres                    
prtclNL                         
NETHERLANDS 1124 1 Christian Democratic Party             X     
  1041 2 Labour Party          X         
  714 3 Party for Freedom and 
Democracy        X       
  141 4 List Pim Fortuyn              X    
  193 5 Democrats `66            X       
  322 6 Green Left         X          
  538 7 Socialistic Party         X          
  178 8 Christian Union              X     
  73 9 Social Reformed Party             X     
  56 10 PVV (List Wilders)              X    
  28 11 Party for the Animals         X        
  11 12 TON (List Verdonk)              X    
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 Freq. 
Code 
Label 
CO
M
 
LS 
SO
 
EC 
LI 
CO
 
REL 
R 
REG
 
AG
R 
SI 
  70 20 Other                    
prtclCH                         
SWITZERLAND 643 1 Radicals             X       
  444 2 Christian democrats             X     
  1273 3 Socialist party          X         
  961 4 Swiss people party              X    
  111 5 Liberal party  (MERGED WITH 
1 in 2009)     X       
  19 6 Christian-social party       X     
  37 7 Swiss labour party       X           
  373 8 Green party           X        
  36 9 Green liberal party          X        
  36 10 Federal Democratic Union             X     
  82 11 Evangelical People's Party             X     
  62 20 Other party                   
Eastern Europe           
 
prtclBG                         
BULGARIA 725 1 BSP           X         
  315 2 GERB              X      
  209 3 DPS (Turkish minority)         X   
  65 4 DSB              X      
  18 5 BZNS-NS                  X  
  44 6 NDSV             X       
  193 7 Ataka                X    
  133 8 SDS               X     
  49 20 Other                    
prtclCZ                         
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
393 1 KSCM         X           
  681 2 CSSD           X         
  88 3 SZ            X        
  233 4 KDU-CSL               X     
  782 5 ODS              X      
  37 6 Association of Independents      X      
  42 7 US Freedom Union            X      
  95 20 Other                    
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 Freq. 
Code 
Label 
CO
M
 
LS 
SO
 
EC 
LI 
CO
 
REL 
R 
REG
 
AG
R 
SI 
prtclEE                         
ESTONIA 310 1 Pro Patria and Res Publica 
Union          X     
  751 2 The Estonian Centre Party          X       
  428 3 Estonian Reform Party           X       
  104 4 The People's Union of 
Estonia              X  
  193 5 The Social Democratic Party        X         
  73 6 Estonian Greens           X        
  65 20 Other                    
prtclDE                  
GERMANY   1 Social Democratic Party 
(SPD)   X         
EAST   2 Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU/CSU)       X     
    3 Green Party (Bündnis90/Die 
Grünen)    X        
    4 Liberal Democratic Party 
(FDP)     X       
    5 The Left Party.Party of 
Democratic Socialism 
(Linkspartei.PDS)  
X          
    6 Republican Party 
(Republikaner)        X    
    7 National Democratic 
Party/German Peoples Union 
(NPD/DVU)        
X    
    20 Other Party            
prtclHU                         
HUNGARY 1373 1 Fidesz - KDNP (coded in a 
single category ESS r4)         X      
  73 2 MDF             X       
  56 3 MIÉP/Jobbik               X    
  1120 4 MSZP           X         
  32 5 Munkáspárt               X    
  121 6 SZDSZ             X       
  33 20 Other                    
prtclPL                         
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 Freq. 
Code 
Label 
CO
M
 
LS 
SO
 
EC 
LI 
CO
 
REL 
R 
REG
 
AG
R 
SI 
POLAND 136 1 League of Polish Families            X     
  495 2 Civic Platform            X       
  56 3 Democratic Party            X       
  125 4 Polish Peasants Party                X  
  349 5 Law and Justice            X      
  172 6 Self-defence               X    
  30 7 Social Democratic Party of 
Poland       X         
  383 8 Democratic Left Alliance         X         
  43 20 Other                    
prtclSK                         
SLOVAKIA 229 1 Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia (HZDS)         X      
  317 2 Slovak Democratic Christian 
Union (SDKU)           X     
  921 3 SMER           X         
  195 4 Party of Hungarian Coalition 
(SMK)             X   
  188 5 Christian Democratic 
Movement (KDH)            X     
  173 6 Slovak National Party (SNS)             X    
  26 7 KSS Communist Party of 
Slovakia     X           
  33 8 ANO New Citizen's Alliance          X       
  58 20 Other                    
prtclSI                         
SLOVENIA 100 1 Democratic Party of 
Pensioners of Slovenia - 
DESUS           
 X 
  412 2 Liberal Democracy of 
Slovenia - LDS        X       
  18 3 Slovene Youth Party - SMS        X        
  146 4 New Slovenia - Christian 
Peoples Party - NSi        X     
  504 5 Slovenian Democratic Party - 
SDS          X      
  108 6 Slovene Peoples Party - SLS          X      
  127 7 Slovene National Party - SNS            X    
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 Freq. 
Code 
Label 
CO
M
 
LS 
SO
 
EC 
LI 
CO
 
REL 
R 
REG
 
AG
R 
SI 
  379 8 Social Democrats - SD        X         
  51 9 ZARES - New Politics          X       
  60 20 Other                    
Southern Europe           
 
prtclCY                  
CYPRUS 483 1 Progressive Party of Working 
People (AKEL) X           
  291 2 Demokrat Party (DIKO)        X       
  452 3 Democratic Rally (DISY)         X      
  50 4 European Party (EVROKO)          X    
  18 5 The Cyprus Green Party      X        
  8 6 United Democrats (EDI)        X       
  113 7 Social Democrats (KS EDEK)     X         
prtclGR                         
GREECE 1401 1 Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement - PASOK       X         
  1424 2 New Democracy - ND           X      
  287 3 Communist Party - KKE      X           
  171 4 Coalition of the Radical Left - 
SYRIZA    X          
  49 5 Popular Orthodox Rally - 
LAOS            X    
  19 6 Greens            X        
  25 20 Other                    
prtclIT                         
ITALY 295 1 Democratici di sinistra        X          
  95 2 La Margherita         X         
  25 3 Comunisti Italiani        X           
  34 4 Verdi e SDI (Girasole)        X        
  97 5 Rifondazione Comunista       X           
  242 6 Forza Italia             X      
  139 7 Alleanza Nazionale            X      
  38 8 CCD-CDU               X     
  37 9 Lega Nord                X   
  12 10 Nuovo PSI          X         
  10 11 Lista di Pietro           X       
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 Freq. 
Code 
Label 
CO
M
 
LS 
SO
 
EC 
LI 
CO
 
REL 
R 
REG
 
AG
R 
SI 
  55 20 Other                    
prtclPT                         
PORTUGAL 181 1 BE - Bloco de Esquerda      X          
  110 2 CDS/PP - Centro Democrático 
Social/Partido Popular          X     
  306 3 PCP-PEV - Partido Comunista 
Português - Partido 
Ecologista o 
X           
  23 4 PCTP-MRPP - Partido 
Comunista dos 
Trabalhadores Portugueses  
X           
  1277 5 PSD - Partido Social 
Democrata         X      
  1705 6 PS - Partido Socialista        X         
  17 20 Other                    
prtclES                         
SPAIN 1101 1 Partido Popular             X      
  1605 2 Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español (PSOE)       X         
  216 3 Izquierda Unida (IU)        X          
  133 4 Convergència i Unió (CiU)              X   
  71 5 Esquerra Repubicana de 
Catalunya (ERC)             X   
  66 6 Partido Nacionalista Vasco 
(PNV)              X   
  52 7 Bloque Nacionalista Galego 
(BNG)              X   
  140 20 Other                    
Atlantic Europe           
 
prtclIE                         
IRELAND 1638 1 Fianna Fail             X      
  888 2 Fine Gael              X     
  387 3 Labour           X         
  65 4 Progressive Democrats           X       
  177 5 Green Party           X        
  183 6 Sinn Fein         X          
  33 20 Other                    
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 Freq. 
Code 
Label 
CO
M
 
LS 
SO
 
EC 
LI 
CO
 
REL 
R 
REG
 
AG
R 
SI 
prtclGB                         
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
1292 1 Conservative        
     X      
  1779 2 Labour           X         
  589 3 Liberal Democrat           X       
  91 4 Scottish National Party               X   
  35 5 Plaid Cymru                X   
  146 6 Green Party           X        
  17 7 British National Party              X    
  5 8 UK Independence Party              X    
  88 20 Other            
 
Label Meaning 
COM Communist 
LS Left-Socialist 
SO Social democratic 
EC Ecological 
LI Liberal 
CO Conservative 
REL Religious 
R Radical right 
REG Regional/Ethnical 
AGR Agrarian/Centre 
SI Single issue 
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D. Manifesto Polarisation Data 
 
cnum 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 ∅ Country 
1 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 4.29 4.29 6.44 6.44 2.08 Austria 
2 4.73 6.90 6.90 6.90 6.90 X X X 6.47 Belgium (Flanders) 
3 3.78 6.45 6.45 6.45 6.45 X X X 5.92 Belgium (Wallonia) 
4 9.75 9.75 9.75 12.87 12.87 12.87 12.87 6.68 11.32 Bulgaria 
5 22.21 28.25 28.25 28.25 28.25 X X X 27.04 Switzerland 
6 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 X X X X 4.05 Cyprus 
7 20.24 20.24 20.24 20.24 15.03 15.03 15.03 15.03 18.50 Czech Republic 
8 15.53 15.53 15.53 17.46 17.46 17.46 17.46 13.79 16.28 Germany (East) 
9 16.63 16.63 16.63 15.05 15.05 15.05 15.05 13.02 15.39 Germany (West) 
10 24.21 24.21 24.21 22.09 22.09 11.28 11.28 11.28 18.83 Denmark 
11 11.53 5.24 5.24 5.24 5.24 X X X 5.24 Estonia 
12 12.67 12.67 9.73 9.73 9.73 9.73 8.85 8.85 10.25 Spain 
13 14.16 15.37 15.37 15.37 15.37 8.36 8.36 8.36 12.59 Finland 
14 9.14 9.14 9.14 9.14 9.14 8.68 8.68 8.68 8.97 France 
15 5.14 5.14 5.14 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 6.32 Great Britain 
16 9.28 9.28 X X X X X X 9.28 Greece 
17 9.01 9.01 9.01 9.01 6.52 6.52 6.52 6.52 7.76 Hungary 
18 9.37 9.37 9.37 9.37 9.37 3.23 3.23 3.23 7.07 Ireland 
19 14.78 14.78 14.78 14.78 32.91 32.91 32.91 32.91 14.78 Italy 
20 7.64 7.64 5.09 5.09 5.09 5.09 5.09 9.11 6.37 Luxemburg 
21 9.66 10.96 10.96 10.96 X X X X 10.63 Netherlands 
22 22.46 22.46 22.46 X X X X X 22.46 Norway 
23 12.82 12.82 12.82 2.42 2.42 3.19 3.19 3.19 6.61 Poland 
24 7.99 7.99 7.99 10.26 10.26 10.26 10.26 12.81 9.73 Portugal 
25 18.81 18.81 18.81 18.81 13.97 13.97 13.97 13.97 16.39 Sweden 
26 8.38 8.38 5.94 5.94 5.94 5.94 6.37 6.37 6.66 Slovenia 
27 12.67 12.67 12.67 12.67 12.87 12.87 12.87 12.87 12.80 Slovakia 
X – No data available 
Red cell values are available data that was not taken into account since the country did not 
participate in the respective round. E.g., Italy did not participate in rounds 3 and 4. 
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E. Overview over the Numerical Values of the Level 2 Variables 
 
cnum Label Country fragmen-
tation 
disprop polaris_
MD 
polaris_ 
survey 
polaris_ 
sdleftright 
matdem 
1 AT Austria 3.25 1.87 2.08 0.95 1.97 1 
2 BEF Belgium 
(Flanders) 
5.08 4.47 6.47 0.65 1.95 1 
3 BEW Belgium 
(Wallonia) 
5.46 5.98 5.92 1.02 2.04 1 
4 BG Bulgaria 5.00 4.38 11.32 1.97 2.70 3 
5 CH Switzerland 5.59 2.37 27.04 1.35 1.90 1 
6 CY Cyprus 4.31 1.77 4.05 2.30 3.05 1 
7 CZ Czech Republic 4.37 5.62 18.50 1.89 2.44 3 
8 DEE Germany (East) 4.20 7.30 16.28 0.85 1.86 3 
9 DEW Germany (West) 3.44 1.73 15.39 0.93 1.79 1 
10 DK Denmark 5.09 0.73 18.83 1.24 2.07 1 
11 EE Estonia 5.23 3.38 5.24 0.72 1.96 3 
12 ES Spain 3.01 5.29 10.25 1.43 2.02 2 
13 FI Finland 5.76 3.08 12.59 1.31 2.02 1 
14 FR France 4.69 19.44 8.97 1.61 2.34 1 
15 GB Great Britain 3.50 17.03 6.32 0.77 1.79 1 
16 GR Greece 2.81 7.06 9.28 1.69 2.20 2 
17 HU Hungary 2.77 7.53 7.76 1.78 2.42 3 
18 IE Ireland 4.00 6.28 7.07 0.48 1.78 1 
19 IT Italy 6.07 5.55 14.78 2.03 2.43 1 
20 LU Luxemburg 4.42 3.19 6.37 0.92 2.15 1 
21 NL Netherlands 5.55 0.89 10.63 1.19 2.02 1 
22 NO Norway 5.45 2.72 22.46 1.32 2.05 1 
23 PL Poland 4.40 5.71 6.61 1.21 2.30 3 
24 PT Portugal 3.23 5.53 9.73 1.49 2.07 2 
25 SE Sweden 4.59 2.02 16.39 1.61 2.29 1 
26 SI Slovenia 5.51 3.55 6.66 1.24 2.36 3 
27 SK Slovakia 7.05 6.06 12.80 1.10 2.34 3 
Grand Mean 4.59 5.20 11.10 1.30 2.16 X 
Mode X X X X X 1 
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F. Variable Coding 
Nominal/ordinal variables: 
code Class  
 
 
(egp) 
Religious 
denomination 
 
(reld) 
Making mind 
up about 
political issues  
(poldcs) 
Seeing politics 
as complicated 
matter  
(polcmpl) 
Worked in 
organisation  
 
(org) 
Gender 
 
 
(gndr) 
Trade 
Union 
member 
(tradeu) 
Area of 
residence 
 
(larea) 
Interest in 
politics  
 
(polinter) 
0 I     Higher 
level service 
class 
No religion Very difficult Frequently No Male No City Not at all 
1 II     Lower 
level service 
class 
Roman Catholic Difficult Regularly Yes Female Yes Town Hardly 
2 IIIa + IIIb    
Routine non-
manual 
Protestant Neither/nor Occasionally    Country-
side 
Quite 
3 IVa + IVb   
Petty 
bourgeoisie 
Other Christian Easy Seldom     Very 
4 V + VI   Skilled 
workers 
Other non-
Christian 
Very easy Never      
5 VIIa + VIIb  
Unskilled 
workers 
        
6 IVc  Farmers         
Interval/ratio scaled variables: 
Label Meaning 
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AGE Biological age 
EDUYRS Years of fulltime education completed (0-25) 
RLGATND Attending religious services, treated as interval level variable; original categories:  Every day – More than once a week – Once a 
week – At least once a month – Only on special holy days – Less often – Never 
TVPOL TV use for political issues, increasing (0-8, half-hour difference) 
RDPOL Radio use for political issues, increasing (0-8, half-hour difference) 
POLNEWS Newspaper use for political issues, increasing (0-8, half-hour difference) 
TRSTPRL Trust in the parliament, increasing trust (0-10) 
TRSTPLT Trust in politicians, increasing trust (0-10) 
TRSTLGL Trust in the legal system, increasing trust (0-10) 
PPLFAIR Most people try to be fair, increasing agreement (0-10) 
PPLHLP Most people try to help, increasing agreement (0-10) 
PPLTRST Most people can be trusted, increasing agreement (0-10) 
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G. Full Regression Models 
 
 pid Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c 
Le
ve
l 1
 
gender  -0.214*** -0.195*** 0.037 0.035 0.035 0.035 
(Female)  (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
age  0.020*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
(Age)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
eduyears  0.040*** 0.032*** -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* 
(Education in years)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
egp1  -0.038 -0.043 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(Lower level service class)  (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
egp2  -0.228*** -0.193*** -0.042 -0.044 -0.045 -0.044 
(Petty bourgeoisie)  (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) 
egp3  -0.151** -0.081 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.032 
(Routine non-manual)  (0.057) (0.059) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) 
egp4  -0.273*** -0.242*** 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.003 
(Skilled workers)  (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) (0.049) 
egp5  -0.319*** -0.277*** -0.014 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 
(Unskilled workers)  (0.049) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
egp6  0.049 0.088 0.234*** 0.237*** 0.236*** 0.235*** 
(Farmers)  (0.066) (0.064) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
area1  0.015 0.066 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
(City)  (0.048) (0.054) (0.038) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) 
area2  -0.003 0.019 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(Town)  (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
religdenom1   0.136*** 0.129** 0.126*** 0.127** 0.128** 
(Roman Catholic)   (0.037) (0.039) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) 
religdenom2   0.259*** 0.222*** 0.223*** 0.221*** 0.220*** 
(Protestant)   (0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
religdenom3   0.022 0.076 0.068 0.067 0.067 
(Other Christian)   (0.097) (0.092) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) 
religdenom4   0.061 -0.029 -0.036 -0.035 -0.035 
(Other non-Christian)   (0.197) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) 
religattend   -0.024 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
(Church attendance)   (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
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 pid Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c 
Le
ve
l 1
 
tradeu1   0.240*** 0.176*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 
(Trade union member)   (0.029) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
organis1   0.600*** 0.397*** 0.398*** 0.397*** 0.396*** 
(Organisation member)   (0.060) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) 
polinter1    0.585*** 0.584*** 0.584*** 0.584*** 
(Hardly)    (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) 
polinter2    1.246*** 1.244*** 1.244*** 1.244*** 
(Quite)    (0.049) (0.042) (0.048) (0.045) 
polinter3    1.942*** 1.939*** 1.939*** 1.939*** 
(Very)    (0.049) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) 
involvement    0.173*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 
(Factor: involvement in politics)    (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
institut.trust    0.242*** 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.240*** 
(Factor: institutional trust)    (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
interpers.trust    0.072*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
(Factor: interpersonal trust)    (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
mediausage    0.063*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 
(Factor: media usage)    (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Le
ve
l 2
 
fragmentation     0.139*** 0.067*** 0.042*** 
(Fragmentation 𝑁𝑗)     (0.019) (0.013) (0.011) 
disprop     -0.004 0.003 0.005 
(Disproportionality 𝐺𝑗)     (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
matdem1     -0.293*** -0.227** -0.332*** 
(Old democracies 𝐴𝐷1𝑗)     (0.035) (0.081) (0.072) 
matdem3     -0.257*** -0.359*** -0.662*** 
(New democracies 𝐴𝐷3𝑗)     (0.037) (0.082) (0.067) 
eastage     0.005 0.005 0.005 
(Interaction 𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝐴𝐷3𝑗)     (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
polaris_MD     -0.008**   
(Polarisation: MD 𝑃𝑗)     (0.003)   
polaris_survey      0.906***  
(Polarisation: Survey 𝑃𝑗)      (0.053)  
polaris_sdleftright       1.306*** 
(Polarisation: Left-right 𝑃𝑗)       (0.049) 
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 pid Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c 
In
te
rc
ep
ts
 _cut11 -0.075 -0.367*** -0.147* 0.975*** 0.792*** 0.824*** 0.574*** 
 (0.087) (0.085) (0.064) (0.062) (0.067) (0.081) (0.061) 
_cut12 0.396*** 0.120 0.349*** 1.516*** 1.332*** 1.364*** 1.128*** 
 (0.101) (0.1099) (0.038) (0.045) (0.056) (0.089) (0.049) 
_cut13 2.638*** 2.413*** 2.670*** 4.009*** 3.826*** 3.858*** 3.663*** 
 (0.158) (0.164) (0.081) (0.104) (0.109) (0.137) (0.096) 
M
od
el
 fi
t 
N 52,728 52,728 52,728 52,728 52,728 52,728 52,728 
LL -58835.740 -57778.250 -57295.48 -54503.98 -54495.75 -54480.94 -54480.06 
Var (2) 0.2289 0.2357 0.7331 0.5566 0.5737 0.1512 0.1605 
ICC 0.0651 0.0669 0.1822 0.1428 0.0738 0.0740 0.0740 
Pseudo-R2 (Mc-Fadden) — 0.0180 0.0262 0.0736 0.1700 0.1706 0.1706 
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke) — 0.0440 0.0636 0.1447 0.1485 0.0439 0.0465 
 Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001  
(Robust standard errors in parentheses) 
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H. Full regression Models with Party Families 
 
 strength Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 
Pa
rt
y 
Fa
m
ily
 
Communist  0.536*** 0.519*** 
  (0.108) (0.130) 
Left socialist  0.063 0.074 
  (0.070) (0.066) 
Social democratic 
(reference category) 
   
Ecologic  -0.044 0.051 
  (0.058) (0.062) 
Liberal  -0.167** -0.204*** 
  (0.048) (0.052) 
Conservative  0.035 0.002 
  (0.033) (0.047) 
Religious  0.081 -0.003 
  (0.066) (0.057) 
Radical right  -0.122** 0.054 
  (0.044) (0.050) 
Regional/Ethnical  0.110 0.197 
  (0.097) (0.102) 
Agrarian/Centre  0.100 0.050 
  (0.111) (0.110) 
Single Issue/Other  -0.007 0.041 
  (0.090) (0.105) 
 share  2.715*** 1.669*** 
 (Share of identifiers)  (0.695) (0.455) 
Le
ve
l 1
 c
on
tr
ol
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
gender   0.136*** 
(Female)   (0.026) 
age   0.004*** 
(Age)   (0.001) 
eduyears   -0.024*** 
(Education in years)   (0.003) 
egp1   0.065 
(Lower level service class)   (0.033) 
egp2   0.055 
(Petty bourgeoisie)   (0.031) 
egp3   0.063 
(Routine non-manual)   (0.038) 
egp4   0.099* 
(Skilled workers)   (0.040) 
egp5   0.180*** 
(Unskilled workers)   (0.045) 
egp6   0.324*** 
(Farmers)   (0.070) 
area1   -0.041 
(City)   (0.026) 
area2   0.009 
(Town)   (0.034) 
religdenom1   -0.050 
(Roman Catholic)   (0.036) 
religdenom2   0.075 
(Protestant)   (0.040) 
religdenom3   0.017 
(Other Christian)   (0.051) 
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 strength Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 
Le
ve
l 1
 c
on
tr
ol
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
religdenom4   -0.056 
(Other non-Christian)   (0.083) 
religattend   -0.051** 
(Church attendance)   (0.017) 
tradeu1   0.033 
(Trade union member)   (0.030) 
organis1   0.238*** 
(Organisation member)   (0.041) 
polinter1   0.108 
(Hardly)   (0.058) 
polinter2   0.584*** 
(Quite)   (0.055) 
polinter3   1.444*** 
(Very)   (0.074) 
involvement   0.192*** 
(Factor: involvement in politics)   (0.019) 
institut.trust   0.202*** 
(Factor: institutional trust)   (0.019) 
interpers.trust   -0.000 
(Factor: interpersonal trust)   (0.012) 
mediausage   0.047** 
(Factor: media usage)   (0.014) 
In
te
rc
ep
ts
 _cut11 -3.838*** -2.514*** -3.404*** 
 (0.207) (0.267) (0.218) 
_cut12 -1.132*** 0.195 -0.617*** 
 (0.150) (0.251) (0.173) 
_cut13 2.220*** 3.554*** 2.983*** 
 (0.123) (0.287) (0.175) 
M
od
el
 fi
t 
N 61,280 61,280 61,280 
LL -56437.39 -56351.497 -53796.102 
Var (2) 1.8903 (.4638) 1.4753 (.3662) 0.5466 (-.1300) 
ICC 0.3649 0.3096 0.1425 
Pseudo-R2 (Mc-Fadden) — 0.0015 0.0468 
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke) — 0.0033 0.0982 
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